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Richard W. Fox describes Reinhold Niebuhr by comparing him to 
Amos: 
It was Amos he wished to follow. The Hebrew prophet had 
warned that the day of the Lord would be darkness and not 
light, that Yahweh had no use for solemn assemblies or burnt 
offerings. God would be impressed when justice rolled down 
like waters and righteousness like an everlasting stream. He 
scorned those who were at ease in Zion, who lay upon beds of 
ivory and ignored the urgency of the hour. Niebuhr shared 
Amos' sense of crisis.' 
Reinhold Niebuhr was an Amos-like prophet who from the 1930s to 
the 1960s boldly proclaimed the sinfulness of individuals and society in 
America. At the time he raised his prophetic voice, the most popular 
understanding of man was liberal optimism's view of human goodness and 
possibility. His prophetic voice of "man as sinner" caused a major shock, 
and it resounded not only in church but also in American society. He has 
often been recognized as one of the best theologians in American history.' 
Furthermore, his public influence would be proved by the fact that Time 
featured Niebuhr in the cover story of its twenty-fifth anniversary issue of 8 
March 1948. It is very rare to find a figure like Niebuhr who was influential 
in both church and society. 
1 Richard W. Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1985), viii. 
2 Charles C. Brown, Niebuhr and His Age: Reinhold Niebuhr's Prophetic Role in 
the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1992), 1. 
1 
Niebuhr taught Christian ethics at Union Theological Seminary in 
New York from 1928 to 1960. He was also extremely active in editing and 
writing for both a Christian and public journal; he was also extensively 
involved in various political activities. 
Niebuhr's influence is still evident even today. For example, more 
than 12 major books about Reinhold Niebuhr have been published in the 
1980s and 1990s.3 Niebuhr's importance for the entire twentieth century is 
obvious; for example, the Christian journal First Things' in March 2000 
chose Niebuhr's Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) as one of the most 
influential books in the twentieth century, along with Karl Barth's lecture, 
Dogmatic in Outline (1946). 
Niebuhr's influence and achievements are so enormous in church 
and society that the total understanding of Reinhold Niebuhr is obviously 
impossible in this thesis. Here, the core of Niebuhr's thought and activity, 
and the theological center of his prophetic denouncing of sin in individuals 
and societies, will be studied: the doctrine of sin and anthropology as its 
presuppositional understanding. 
3 For example, Ronald H. Stone, Professor Reinhold Niebuhr, (Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), Kenneth Durkin, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
(Harrisburg: Morehouse Publishing, 1989), Richard W. Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A 
Biography (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), Charles C. Brown, Niebuhr and His 
Age: Reinhold Niebuhr's Prophetic Role in the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: Trinity 
Press International, 1992), Larry Rasmussen, ed. Theologian of Public Life (London: 
Collins, 1989), Robin W. Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, (Cambrigde: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), and so forth. 
4 Matthew Berke, "A Century in Books: An Anniversary Symposium," First 
Things 101 (March 2000): 33-36. 
2 
Niebuhr's anthropology and doctrine of sin have been crystallized in 
his magnum opus, Nature and Destiny of Man (vol. 1 in 1941 and vol. 2 in 
1943). This book will be the main text to be studied, along with consulting 
of his other works which treat the same theme, Beyond Tragedy: Essays on 
the Christian Interpretation of History (1937) and Faith and History (1949). 
Niebuhr's anthropology and doctrine of sin will be analytically studied and 
evaluated in this thesis, observing the coherence of his hermeneutics in his 
theology. Furthermore, how much orthodox Christianity' can learn from 
and interact with Niebuhr's doctrines will be part of the final evaluation. 
5 Niebuhr uses the term orthodox Christianity with reference to Christianity 
within the classical theological tradition of Augustine and the Reformation. See the 
quotations on pages 59 and 63. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THE HERMENEUTIC OF REINHOLD NIEBUHR 
Understanding the theology of Reinhold Niebuhr is a great challenge, 
because all components of his theology are intricately interrelated with 
each other. It is therefore not proper to describe only his anthropology and 
doctrine of sin, the primary focus of this study, without also mentioning 
other matters related to it. 
This first chapter will first examine Niebuhr's theological 
presuppositions and framework, namely Christian Realism and 
dialecticism, within which his theology developed. Next his doctrine of 
revelation and history will be presented. 
Christian Realism 
Reinhold Niebuhr has often been categorized as a neo-orthodox 
theologian. This categorization is true when Niebuhr's role in American 
church history is compared to neo-orthodoxy's shattering of liberal 
optimism in Europe. Just as Barth began his criticism of liberalism with 
The Epistle to the Romans (1919), so did Niebuhr with Moral Man in Immoral 
Society (1932). Without question the strong influence on Niebuhr of 
European neo-orthodoxy is obvious: Niebuhr himself publicly expressed 
his theological indebtedness to Emil Brunner.' 
' Reinhold Niebuhr, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," Reinhold Niebuhr: 
His Religious, Social, and Political Thought (New York: Macmillan, 1956), 431. Hans 
Even so, the theological position of Niebuhr is more correctly known 
as Christian Realism. Under his leadership, a group of theologians became 
convinced of the need to correct the prevalent liberal optimism in America. 
This group was persuaded that Christian Realism presented a more correct 
understanding of the nature of man. The members of this group were 
Walter Marshall Horton, Robert Lowry Calhoun, John Coleman Bennett, 
and H. Richard Niebuhr. 
Bennett elucidates in his Christian Realism the group's theological 
concern and distinctives as follows: 
The primary reference of the word "Realism" in the title is 
to the conviction pervading the book that Christianity avoids 
the illusions of both the optimists and the pessimists. I believe 
that the liberal optimism of the past generation and the 
theologians who deduce their view of human possibilities from 
a dogma of original sin which goes beyond the evidence are 
both wrong.2 
Moreover, 
We are distrustful of ambitious theological schemes based 
upon dogmas that are never fully criticized in the light of what 
they mean in terms of concrete experience.' 
Here Bennett rejects both the optimism of liberalism and the 
pessimism of neo-orthodoxy. The balance between them is what concerns 
Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, trans. Louis Pettibone Smith (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), 238. Brown, Niebuhr and His Age, 69-70. 
2 John C. Bennett, Christian Realism (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), 
x. 
3 Bennett, Christian Realism, 17. See also Edward Carnell, The Theology of 
Reinhold Niebuhr (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951), 38. 
5 
Christian Realism the most. More precisely, Christian Realism denies any 
dogmatic forming of reality into its theological system. On the contrary, 
they emphasize experience as the judge of dogma. 
We desire to know more clearly what a doctrine of sin means 
psychologically or in terms of actual social experience, and 
when we hear about such ideas as the doctrine of the two 
natures of Christ or the theory of the impersonal humanity of 
Christ we press for some explanation of what those ideas mean 
for our understanding of Jesus Christ as a concrete human 
individual. When we hear pious words about the Church, with 
a capital C, we desire to know how those words apply to the 
very familiar and very human institutions in our communities 
which we call churches. This empirical temper seems to me to 
be a quite necessary corrective for traditional ways of 
thinking . . . .4 
Thus the role of theology is an interpretation of empirical reality from 
a biblical perspective. The concern is not with metaphysical or ontological 
discussions. Theology must be related to experiential life. In this sense 
Christian Realism has a strong pragmatic emphasis on theology.' 
Historically, the experience of WWI and the rise of fascism in Europe 
in the 1930s were severe enough for people to face the disillusionment of 
the optimism of liberalism. Within such an atmosphere, Christian Realists 
came to understood "man as sinner" rather than as essentially good. This 
experiential judgment required a reexamination of the doctrine of sin, 
4 Bennett, Christian Realism, 17. 
5 Roger L. Shinn, "Realism, Radicalism, and Eschatology in Reinhold Niebuhr: 
A Reassessment," The Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr, ed. by Nathen A. Scott, Jr. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), 91, points out Niebuhr's pragmatic 
approach to the theological enterprise. 
6 
which had been neglected for so long by liberalism.6 Reformation doctrine 
of course sees man as sinner, but Christian Realists could not accept such 
doctrine because their commitment to the prominence of experience would 
not allow for the supernatural elements of the story of the Fall and original 
sin. 
Consequently the reinterpretation of the Reformation doctrine of sin 
became an urgent task for Christian Realists. Thelen's words succinctly 
describe the goal and method of the theological approach of Christian 
Realism: 
These men [Christian Realists] have come to believe that 
historic Christian theology possesses in its doctrines of the 
creation of man and his Fall from an original perfection a 
description of the human situation which strikes a more just 
balance between optimism and pessimism, and so provides the 
basis for a sounder approach to the problems of ethics and 
social salvation, than has recently prevailed in American 
thought.' 
To sum up, the theological characteristics of Christian Realism are a 
proper balance between optimism and pessimism, plus a reinterpretation 
of traditional Christianity from an empirical and pragmatic outlook that 
seeks the salvation of society. 
In terms of a theological position, it can be inferred from its sense of 
6 Mary Frances Thelen, Man as Sinner, in Contemporary American Realistic 
Theology (New York: King's Crown Press, 1946), 5. 
7 Thelen, Man as Sinner, 1. 
7 
balance between optimism and pessimisms that Christian Realism is 
located between liberalism and neo-orthodoxy.9 Naturally there are a 
variety of positions for Christian Realists to assume between these two 
poles. 
Reinhold Niebuhr belonged to and led, as its most influential leader, 
this theological movement. His theological works and activities shared the 
goal and method of Christian Realism, as it will be examined later. 
Dialecticism 
In philosophy, dialecticism arose as an attempt to overcome the 
established Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and the 
noumenal. The dialecticism we will discuss here is Kierkegaard's, which 
recognizes the phenomenal-noumenal distinction but emphasizes the 
importance of the dynamic tension between those two realms. 
To identify Niebuhr as the most prominent Christian Realist is 
meaningful for clarifying the goal and motivation of his theological 
endeavor. In this section the principles of his theology will be considered. 
8 In balancing optimism and pessimism, Christian Realists reject the 
pessimism of neo-orthodoxy. This pessimism comes from their rejection of the 
essential continuity between God and man. Neo-orthodoxy does not see the divine 
character in man, which is foundation of the optimism of liberalism. God is "Wholly 
Other." Philosophically speaking, neo-orthodoxy strongly affirms the discontinuity 
between eternity and time. The dialectic of eternity and time and their discontinuity 
are key concepts of neo-orthodoxy. In contrast Christian Realism holds the continuity 
between eternity and time, while it admits the distinction between them (balance of 
continuity and distinction). This will be treated fully in the next section. 
9 Thelen, Man as Sinner, 7-8. 
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Dialecticism is the most fundamental principle that drove his theological 
task. As will be demonstrated later, a dialectic and tension between two 
poles exists in almost every subject of Niebuhr's works.' In fact Niebuhr 
has often been called a representative of neo-orthodoxy in America, for his 
theology is the one which utilized a dialectical perspective most effectively 
and indispensably. 
This seems to contradict what was presented above as one of the 
characteristics of Christian Realism, namely a rejection of neo-orthodoxy's 
belief in the discontinuity of the divine and human. It is thus important to 
remember that although Niebuhr constructed his theology based on a 
dialectical perspective, he did not agree with neo-orthodoxy's absolute 
discontinuity between God and man, the so-called "supernaturalism" of 
Barth 11 As a Christian Realist Niebuhr had to set himself to pursue a 
balance of discontinuity and continuity, adapting dialecticism for his 
theological principle. 
The origin of dialecticism in Niebuhr's theology is Kierkegaard. 
Niebuhr was deeply influenced by Kierkegaard's thought and often praises 
Kierkegaard's profound insight on his understanding of man based on 
1° Langdon Gilkey, "Reinhod Niebuhr's Theology of History," The Legacy of 
Reinhold Niebuhr, ed. Nathan A. Scott, Jr. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1975), 44. 
11 The problem of continuity and discontinuity had appeared in the neo-
orthodox school as the debate on the issue of "point of contact" between Brunner, who 
recognized the possibility of natural theology, and the supernaturalist Barth. 
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dialecticism in his book The Nature and Destiny of Man.12 To understand 
Niebuhr's dialectic theology, first an apprehension of the significance of 
Kierkegaard's dialecticism in philosophy and theology is essential. 
Kierkegaard's dialecticism should be understood in comparison to, or 
as a contradicting alternative for, Hegel's dialecticism. The rise of 
dialecticism occurred as an attempt to overcome the inherited problem of 
the dualism of eternity and time by presenting their unity. In Hegel's 
dialecticism, this problem is rejected in the context of a subject-object 
epistemology, because as long as Hegel treats epistemology in this 
framework the problem remains inescapable. Instead, Hegel posited the 
Spirit, absolute subject, which is inclusive of eternity and time in itself. 
This absolute Spirit produces subjective development continually through 
the becoming of the temporal to a new higher concept of unity. In this 
process, the dialectic of the temporal and the eternal comes to a synthesis. 
This synthesis then becomes a new thesis, which has a new antithesis and 
reaches to a new synthesis of higher unity. 
Kierkegaard emphasized the importance of subjectivity, as Hegel did 
by positing absolute subject. But Kierkegaard's subjectivity is that of the 
individual, so-called "subjective-self." Kierkegaard opposed Hegel's 
dialectical movement of logic. He argued that establishing such an 
existential system to comprehend the reality of existence was impossible. 
12 Niebuhr Reinhold, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, (New York: Charles 
10 
Any kind of system within history cannot express the profound meaning of 
the reality of existence. Van Til explains Kierkegaard's conviction with a 
quotation: 
He says that existence is "a difficult category to deal with." It 
will not allow itself to be neatly thought into a pattern. When 
we think existence, says Kierkegaard, we thereby abrogate or 
destroy it. The individual will lose itself when it betakes itself to 
the highroad of logical relationships. That highroad is built in 
the sky. Its realm is that of abstract possibility. Upon it one 
may go in any direction and always reach the same destination, 
which is the same as no destination.' 
The dialectic of Hegel, "both/and," is firmly rejected by Kierkegaard. 
Eternity and time cannot be unified in history. Instead, the dialectic of 
eternity and time is "either/or," such that the distinction and discontinuity 
between them is absolute. In this tension and decision to take "either/or," 
the reality of existence appears. Thus Kierkegaard sustains the dualism of 
eternity and temporality and believes that the discontinuity between them 
is absolute. The emphasis on the absolute Spirit as the subject of Hegel's 
historical realization of unity is substituted with the individual as subject. 
Van Til describes this point as follows: 
But the true subjective thinker is constantly occupied in 
striving. He has no finite goal before him. He "strives infinitely, 
is constantly in process of becoming. And this, his striving, is 
Scribner's Sons, 1941), 170-71, 243. 
13 Cornelius van Til, The New Modernism, An Appraisal of the Theology of Barth 
and Brunner, (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 
1946), 55. His quotation of Kierkegaard is from Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 
trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1941), 274. 
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safeguarded by his constantly being just as negative as he is 
positive." Finality at any point must at all costs be avoided. 
"System and finality are pretty much one and the same, so 
much so that if the system is not finished, there is no system." 
According to Kierkegaard, Lessing was right when he said that 
if God held eternal striving in His left hand and eternal, 
finished truth in His right, he would choose the left.' 
Therefore, according to Kierkegaard, the subjective-self must be 
about its endeavor to reach eternity with its everlasting process of 
becoming, even though that sought-after possibility is in the end an 
impossibility because of the absolute time-eternity discontinuity. This 
existential situation of the individual is presented well in the words of 
Carnell: 
Sin is a tensionless surrender to things as they are. Only in 
either/or decision is passion in man aroused. Both/and is of 
sin. In existential living one passionately seeks to mediate in 
his own person the height of an absolute law of love, yet 
sensing all the time the inevitability of his own sinfulness. 
Existential living, then, is inward tension in crisis, decision, 
passion. Character and salvation are created in the passionate, 
choosing moment of either/or decisions, those moments when 
life and death, happiness and unhappiness, health and 
sickness lie in the balance.' 
When Kierkegaard ponders Christianity with his dialecticism, the 
concept of "leap" is very important. 
"For how great is the difference" between man and himself. God 
has reserved for Himself His "unfathomable grief" because of 
the distance between man and Himself. He cannot bring man 
14  van Til, New Modernism, 63, quotations are from Kierkegaard, Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript, 84, 98. 
15 Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 33-34. 
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up to a level with Himself. So He brings Himself down to the 
level of man. God becomes. He suffers all things, endures all 
things, makes experience of all things. He walks about 
incognito. Hence man cannot prove His existence. The logic of 
man has no direct connection with Him. "As long as I keep my 
hold on the proof, i.e., continue to demonstrate, the existence 
does not come out, if for no other reason than that I am 
engaged in proving it; but when I let the proof go, the existence 
is there." Existence can be reached only by a leap. God remains 
wholly unknown even when He becomes man. God must be 
known as the Unknown.16 
The individual before God has to leap to know God, Absolute other, 
giving up reason. But still here God as the Unknown even in temporality 
remains, because of discontinuity. 
Kierkegaard's dialecticism was discovered and adapted by Karl Barth 
as the core principle of his theology that appeared in his The Epistle to the 
Romans (1919). The book was filled with the exact resounding of the 
message of Kierkegaard's dialecticism: God as the Unknown, the Wholly 
Other based on the absolute discontinuity of eternity and time as well as of 
reality and reason. Without question Barth set his theological center on 
Kierkegaard's. Barth is the most faithful successor of Kierkegaard with his 
further theological development along the lines of dialecticism. 
Niebuhr also adapted Kierkegaard's dialecticism for his theological 
principle. He rejected the romantic approach of Hegelian dialecticism, 
which believed in the unification of the eternal and the temporal right in 
history. In all of his works, when he reviews human history, Niebuhr 
16  van Til, New Modernism, 60. 
13 
criticizes the human endeavor to find fulfillment of the unification in nature 
or history, as well as in eternity as the idealists tried to do.' As we will 
examine later, Niebuhr's theology of history is constructed on Kierkegaard's 
dialecticism of the discontinuity between eternity and time With 
Kierkegaard, only at the "moment" of decision within the tension of the 
dialectic condition, or at the moment of the "leap," the possibility of 
unification is only implied. Niebuhr, on the other hand, believes that the 
fulfillment of unification is only by God beyond history.18 Also the dialectic 
between the existential system of philosophy, logic, rationality, etc. and 
reality of existence, like religious truth, is obviously a consistent belief for 
Niebuhr. This will be proved by his reply to Paul Tillich's question on 
epistemology, which was a long-term discussion between them.' 
Revelation 
Revelation (considered in this section) and history (taken up in the 
next section) are intimately related in Niebuhr's theology. Niebuhr's fame 
as a theologian is often ascribed to his theology of history. His perspective 
17 For example, Niebuhr Reinhold, "History Reduced to Nature" and "History 
Swallowed Up in Eternity," The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, (Charles Scribner's 
Sons: New York, 1943), 7-15. 
18 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 96. Shinn, "Realism, 
Radicalism, and Eschatology in Reinhold Niebuhr: A Reassessment," 87, analyzes the 
importance of Niebuhr's endeavor to synthesize the Reformation and Renaissance as 
lying in his use of the categories of discontinuity and continuity. 
" Niebuhr, "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," 432-33. 
14 
of the history of man is soteriological. The fruits of human cultures, states, 
and societies in history are seen as human endeavors for self-redemption 
that sought to reach the highest truth or overcome social sin and evil. How 
this self-redemptive action should be understood from a position of biblical 
faith is his concern and way to approach theologically the problem of social 
sin. For this reason, it is necessary to understand his concept of human 
history and of the revelation of God as an indispensable element for its 
salvation. 
To understand the meaning of history for man, Niebuhr posits two 
dialectics: the dialectic of eternity and time and the dialectic in human 
nature. For man history is not only the flux of time in nature. There is also 
the dialectical nature of man: on the one hand, man was created in the 
image of God so he is spiritually able to transcend himself, but on the other 
hand, because of his creatureliness, he is bound and limited to nature.' 
This spiritual transcendence of man allows him to interact with nature, or 
the natural flux of history, and it leads him to change that flux in an 
attempt to direct the way in which he believes history would be fulfilled. 
But at the same time nature is the other part of history, which opposes the 
freedom of man in history. Thus Niebuhr says: 
Man's ability to transcend the flux of nature gives him the 
capacity to make history. Human history is rooted in the 
natural process but it is something more than either the 
20 The dialectical nature of man will be fully discussed in the next chapter. 
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determined sequences of natural causation or the capricious 
variations and occurrences of the natural world. It is 
compounded of natural necessity and human freedom.' 
With such a framework of the possibility of the development of 
history within human nature, man lives and struggles with both the 
process of natural necessities and his various interpretations of the 
meaning of history and life. Because of human sin, Niebuhr sees the 
impossibility for man to have any satisfactory interpretation of history and 
its meaning through human endeavor. The only way to have a proper 
interpretation comes from revelation from God.22 
Three types of revelation that Niebuhr presents are general 
revelation, God's creation as revelation, and special revelation.23  
The first is general (or private) revelation. Niebuhr means general 
revelation as private revelation in the consciousness of every person, 
through which he can reach a reality beyond himself. Because this 
experience is universal, it is called general revelation. In this contact with 
God in his consciousness, man gets a dim recognition of the relationship 
with the "Wholly Other": 
The first is the sense of reverence for a majesty and of 
21 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 1. 
22 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 96. 
23 Instead of more traditional understanding of general revelation as revelation 
in the created world, including inner human nature, and of special revelation as 
revelation through His supernatural action, Niebuhr attaches his own understanding 
to them. 
16 
dependence upon an ultimate source of being. The second is 
the sense of moral obligation laid upon one from beyond 
oneself and of moral unworthiness before a judge. The third, 
most problematic of the elements in religious experience, is the 
longing for forgiveness.' 
According to Niebuhr, dim recognition of God as "Creator," "Judge," 
and "Redeemer" by general revelation will become sharply defined by 
creation revelation (a type of general revelation) and historical and special 
revelation. 
The second is the revelation of creation. God reveals Himself as 
Creator through His creation. Every human receives the message from 
nature. In this revelation inner recognition of the Creator becomes the 
reality of the outer world. Man acknowledges that he is created by and 
dependent on God and has responsibility before Him. 
The last revelation is special revelation. Niebuhr thinks that special 
revelation is given to man through historical events.' Dim recognition of 
God as Judge in human consciousness was a serious concern of personal 
religions. Furthermore, in Hebrew religion the theme of God as Judge and 
Redeemer was significantly developed in the religious and historical events, 
even though they could not reach a full understanding of the relationship 
24 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 131. 
' Reinhold Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian Interpretation of 
History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), 13. See also Judith Plaskow, Sex, 
Sin And Grace: Women's Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul 
Tillich (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 53. 
17 
between God's righteousness and his mercy.' The final special revelation 
is the revelation of Christ on the Cross. In this revelation, God revealed His 
transcendent divine mercy and freedom over His own law, namely, God as 
Redeemer.' The fact that even Hebraic religion as the highest human 
religious product could not resolve the truth of God's mercy and 
righteousness demonstrated that the true Messiah is not a natural result 
of human endeavor, because the resolution of the truth is not possible with 
human wisdom. Niebuhr emphasizes the uniqueness of the revelation of 
Christ as follows: 
The truth which is revealed in the Cross is not a truth which 
could have been anticipated in human culture and it is not the 
culmination of human wisdom. The true Christ is not expected. 
All human wisdom seeks to complete itself from the basis of its 
partial perspective.' 
Just as the truth of salvation was only revealed by the special 
revelation of Christ, and as the incomplete understanding of man had to be 
completed and clarified by revelation, so was it that ethical truth, the law of 
love, had to be revealed by the revelation of Christ. The highest ethical 
standard of man within Roman law (mutual love) could not reach the law of 
the sacrificing love of Jesus. Christ as the "Second Adam" revealed the law 
26 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 131-32. Cf. Hofmann, The 
Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 153. 
27 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 67. 
28  Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 62. See also, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), 107. 
18 
of Agape to man as the law to follow.' 
Finally, there is the relationship between historical and special 
revelation and faith. For Niebuhr, faith and contrition are keys to discern 
special revelation.' Without faith and contrition, revelation from God 
cannot be apprehended.31  
History 
Niebuhr's analysis of history is also based on his anthropology of the 
dialectical nature of spiritual transcendence and finiteness in nature. While 
man is bound within the flux of nature because of his creatureliness, he 
can positively relate to history and direct it toward his goal. In other words, 
29 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 92. The relation between 
revelation and salvation will be fully discussed in chapter 2. 
It is important to understand that the Scriptures are not treated as a revelation 
in Niebuhr's doctrine of revelation. Niebuhr does not believe the Scriptures to be 
verbal revelation from God given through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. In fact, it is 
manifestly the case that Niebuhr does not mention the work of the Holy Spirit and is 
criticized for the lack of doctrine of the Holy Spirit. As it is, the revelation of creation 
and general revelation in the individual relate neither to the Scriptures nor to the fmal 
revelation in Christ. For Niebuhr, the Scriptures are basically the mythology of 
Hebraic religion and symbolical interpretations of the primitive church. So prophetic 
judgemental words and messianic hope in the Old Testament are mostly human 
recognition of them through the experiences in history with nonscriptural revelation of 
creation and general revelation. 
3° Kenneth Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit: A Continuing Theology 
Thorn," Scottish Journal of Theology 19, no. 1 (1966): 30, 32, criticizes Niebuhr's 
theology of revelation as essentially the product of human experience or "built-in 
revelation." 
31 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 136. The importance of faith 
for apprehension of revelation from God will be discussed further in chapter 2. 
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he is capable of making history.32 
In actuality, human understanding of the fulfillment of history is 
related to the dialectic of the eternal and the temporal. Niebuhr analyzes 
the human understanding of the locus of the fulfillment of history as 
follows: 
The attempt to deny the reality of history, by reducing it to 
the dimension of a meaningless natural sequence, is most 
perfectly expressed in classical thought in its meditations upon 
death and its protestations against the fear of death.' 
and 
But they find something in man which classical naturalism 
does not find; and by that something man is to be emancipated 
from history. That something is either the intellectual principle 
of his soul, or something even more transcendent than his 
mind. Classical idealism and mysticism in short understand 
the transcendent freedom of the human spirit; but they do not 
understand it in its organic relation to the temporal process.' 
Excluding transcendent spiritual freedom, naturalism (like 
Democritus and Epicurus) reduces history to the flux of nature. By 
contrast, ignoring human finiteness within the natural and temporal 
process, idealism and mysticism seek fulfillment in eternity. These two 
types of interpreting history are the only possible ones within man's own 
endeavor, according to Niebuhr's anthropology. In other words, man can 
32 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 1. 
33 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 7. 
34 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 11. 
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only see the fulfillment of life and history in either side of the dialectic, the 
eternal or the temporal. If man believes that his spiritual side is 
transcendent, he will seek the fulfillment of history in the eternal; if he 
identifies himself with nature, he seeks that fulfillment within history. 
Basically, human thought and activities, like culture, can be analyzed with 
this formula.' 
Human history and man's productions within it, for example 
cultures, are his endeavors to see the fulfillment of the meaning of history 
with such understandings. In terms of the human endeavor, the closely 
interwoven situation of revelation should also be insisted upon. Through 
the revelation of creation and general revelation, man can recognize that he 
is responsible to the Creator God who gave him life and to God as the 
Commander of law and Judge of his moral achievements. Revelation has 
been a strong basis for man to think the truth and about human life. Man 
has been seeking the truth and ethical life as he should be to fulfill his life 
and history. In history man has his freedom to fulfill the goal but is trapped 
with his sinful nature of pride.' Niebuhr expresses the struggle and 
continuing thoughts: 
Only gradually it is realized that man's effort to deny and to 
escape his finiteness in imperial ambitions and power add an 
element of corruption to the fabric of history and that this 
ss While this idea of history is everywhere in his works, The Nature and Destiny 
of Man, vol. 1, chapters 1-4, especially discusses this matter. 
36 The subject of sin will be fully discussed in chapter 2. 
21 
corruption becomes a basic characteristic of history and a 
perennial problem from the standpoint of the fulfillment of 
human history and destiny. It is recognized that history must 
be purged as well as completed; and that the final completion 
of history must include God's destruction of man's abortive 
and premature efforts to bring history to its culmination.' 
In human history without special revelation from God, man can 
reach the understanding of the need for a moral society, along with its 
impossibility due to the problem of prospering evil. People will then have a 
messianic hope to vindicate the victory of righteousness over evil. Human 
thought and social endeavor for better community in human history could 
be understood as evidence of his struggle for its realization. Human 
wisdom of truth and ethics does not give the resolution for this problem. 
Niebuhr gives the verdict that it is fruitless. 
This ultimate problem is given by the fact that human history 
stands in contradiction to the divine will on any level of its 
moral and religious achievements in such a way that in any 
"final" judgment the righteous are proved not to be 
righteous."38  
Without special revelation, at the most man can come to a concern over 
how the righteous will gain victory over the unrighteous.' Niebuhr believes 
that only through special revelation in Christ is the answer given. Through 
the special revelation of Christ man can realize that the real problem was 
37 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 4. 
38 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 43. 
39 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 43. 
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not the vindication of the righteous over evil but overcoming evil with good 
and the unrighteousness of the righteous.4°  
Through the special revelation in Christ's Atonement, God as 
Redeemer is fully revealed. The conflict between God's wrath—the result of 
man's immorality—and God's mercy is resolved in the Atonement through 
Christ. In the presence of God all men are sinners, so before God there is 
no distinction between the righteousness and unrighteousness of human 
standards. Niebuhr observes the character of God in Jesus Christ: 
The wisdom apprehended in Christ finally clarifies the 
character of God. He has a resource of mercy beyond His law 
and judgment but He can make it effective only as He takes the 
consequences of His wrath and judgment, upon and into 
Him  self.41  
Only by faith in receiving this revelation can man escape from his 
fruitless and endless endeavor and complete the meaning of history. This 
revelation alone gives man the knowledge that he cannot realize the 
meaning of life and history on earth in history but he has hope in God. 
The fulfillment of this hope in Christ has to be "beyond tragedy," 
"beyond history," not in history.42 Here we can observe Niebuhr's strong 
conviction of the discontinuity of the dialectic of eternity and time, as well 
as his seeking of continuity by putting "hope" in history. 
4° Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 30. 
41 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 55. 
42 It is important to understand that because of Niebuhr's strong conviction of 
dialecticism he cannot admit the fulfillment of the meaning of history in history. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DOCTRINE OF MAN 
Niebuhr's thorough analysis of man's historical views is based on the 
twin standards of the dialectic in human nature and the dialectic of eternity 
and time.' In a word, it is his utmost concern to understand how man, who 
has both spiritual freedom and the boundaries of nature, reacts to the 
dialectic of eternity and time. The thoughts and achievements of man are 
squarely evaluated from this perspective. Niebuhr, however, did not adopt 
his dialectic perspective simply for elucidating them. In fact, he needed an 
anthropology to clearly present man as a sinner.2 As can clearly be seen in 
his works, the sin that concerns him the most is social or collective man's 
sin. In his treatment of sin, he starts with a precise psychological and 
theological study of sin at a personal level, then develops it from there to the 
collective level. 
Thus Niebuhr's anthropology is the key to comprehend his doctrine 
of sin. Niebuhr's anthropology consists of two essential parts: man as the 
image of God and man as creature. Niebuhr seeks to develop both of these 
parts Biblically through a discussion of classical Christian thought on 
these issues. This means that Niebuhr seeks a true biblical view of man by 
examining Hellenistic influences in classical Christianity 
1 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, chapters 1-5. 
2 See the concern of Christian Realism to explain "man as sinner" in chapter 1. 
Imago Dei, 
Niebuhr briefly examines the biblical use of ruach and nephesh of 
the Old Testament, and nvEty.cc and 4ruxTj of the New Testament. He concludes 
that ruach and TrvEDIlix mean "spirit," and that nephesh and 4luxii mean "soul." 
However, Niebuhr takes care to note that in the Old Testament context, 
though there is a distinction between ruach and nephesh, they are never 
separated from each other as soul and body. Moreover, in the New 
Testament context TryEU** is used exclusively to mean spirit in distinction 
from the more rationalistic voilc of Greek philosophy.' Succinctly in one 
sentence, Niebuhr summarizes the biblical view of spirit and body: 
The Hebraic sense of the unity of body and soul is not 
destroyed while, on the other hand, spirit is conceived of as 
primarily a capacity for and affinity with the divine.' 
In Christian theology, "image of God" has developed into the explicit 
"spirit is conceived of as primarily a capacity for and affinity with the 
divine." Observing the history of Christian theology, Niebuhr perceives the 
strong influence of Hellenistic philosophy, specifically of Platonism and of 
the Aristotelian concept of man as a rational creature, in its definition of the 
image of God, along with a slight recognition of self-transcendental 
character of man.' Niebuhr then praises Augustine very highly because he 
3 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 151-52. 
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 152. 
5 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 153. Niebuhr describes 
various theologians' understandings throughout history of the image of God in two 
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is the first Christian theologian who presented the right apprehension of 
the Christian doctrine of man. Niebuhr accepts almost fully Augustine's 
doctrine of man. He basically presented his doctrine of man through that of 
Augustine. 
Augustine describes the image of God as follows: 
"It is in the soul of man, that is, in his rational or intellectual 
soul, that we must find that image of the Creator which is 
immortally implanted in its immortality . . . "6 
Although this expression itself seems to resonate the Hellenistic 
influence of the idea of man as rational animal, the phrase "rational or 
intellectual soul" in Augustine's thought is different from the rational 
ability to form general concepts. Rather, it means the capacity of 
transcendence to the point of self-transcendence in the human spirit.' 
Reason is a faculty that distinguishes man from other animals At the 
same time, while this rational capacity helps man to understand the 
temporal world better in a systematic way, such a work of reason still 
belongs to nature. Kierkegaard's strong conviction that an "existential 
pages of footnotes. 
6 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 154. Quotation from 
Augustine, De trin., XIV,4,6. (ellipses original). 
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 155. Niebuhr sees the 
important influence of neo-Platonism in Augustine on self-transcendence by 
mentioning that Plotinus understands vows as the capacity for self-knowledge and 
introspection. 
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system cannot grasp the reality of existence" is at issue here.8 Reason in the 
sense of Greek philosophy is not good enough to reach eternity, the 
relationship of man with. God.9 
Niebuhr further investigates Augustine's concept of the self-
transcendence of man as the image of God through observing his 
understanding of memory. Memory is the capacity of man to transcend 
both time and himself. 
"When I enter there [the place of memory] I require what I will 
to be brought forth and something instantly comes; others 
must be longer sought after, which are fetched as it were out of 
some inner receptacle. . . . Nor yet do the things themselves 
enter in; only the images of the things perceived are there in 
readiness, for thought to recall. . . . For even while I dwell in 
darkness and silence, in my memory I can produce colours if I 
will ... yea I discern the breath of lilies from violets, though 
smelling nothing. . . . These things I do in the vast court of my 
memory. . . . There also I meet with myself, and recall myself 
and when and where and what I have done and under what 
feelings. . . . Out of the same store do I myself with the past 
continually combine fresh likenesses of things, which I have 
experienced, have believed; and thence again infer future 
actions, events and hopes, and all these again I reflect on, as 
present. I will do this or that, say I to myself, in that great 
receptacle of my mind, stored with images of things so many 
and so great, and this or that might be."'°  
Thus Augustine is amazed with the indeterminate freedom of the 
8 See DialtgAirlim in chapter 1, 8ff. 
9 Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt : A Christian Anthropology, trans. Wyon Olive 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947), 109, explains the work of reason as the 
image of God "in a relative sense". 
10 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 155. No reference for the 
quotation. 
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self-transcendental power of the spirit of man which appears in memory. 
Mentioning Augustine's recognition of the possibility of self-transcendental 
spirit of man in mysticism, as well as Christianity, Niebuhr describes the 
distinction and relation between self-transcendental spirit and reason: 
Augustine's interest in, and emphasis upon, the mysteries and 
majesties of the human spirit are not derived solely from the 
insights of the Christian religion. They are so remarkable 
because he was able to exploit what mysticism and 
Christianity, at their best, have in common: their 
understanding that the human spirit in its depth and height 
reaches into eternity and that this vertical dimension is more 
important for the understanding of man than merely his 
rational capacity for forming general concepts. This latter 
capacity is derived from the former. It is, as it were, a capacity 
for horizontal perspectives over the wide world, made possible 
by the height at which the human spirit is able to survey the 
scene." 
Here, the spirit functions in a vertical direction, and reason functions 
horizontally. The capacity of reason to form general concepts is derived 
from the spirit. 
Niebuhr emphasized another facet of Augustine's doctrine of the 
image of God: 
However, Augustine's Biblical faith always prompts him finally 
to stop short of the mystic deification of self-consciousness. 
Man's powers point to God; but they cannot comprehend him: 
"Insofar as concerns the nature of man there is in him nothing 
better than the mind or reason. But he who would live 
blessedly ought not to live according to them; for then he would 
live according to man, whereas he ought to live according to 
God." Or again: "We are speaking of God. Is it any wonder that 
Thou dost not comprehend? For if Thou dost comprehend, He 
11 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 157. 
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is not God. . . . To reach God by the mind in any measure is a 
great blessedness; but to comprehend Him is altogether 
impossible."12 
Augustine's apparent departure from the mysticism of neo-Platonism is 
seen in the above quotation. He succeeded in escaping from the deification 
of the spiritual profundity of the human spirit. Mysticism presupposes the 
divine nature in man and expands until the assimilation of himself with the 
divine. "He who would live blessedly ought not to live according to them; for 
then he would live according to man, whereas he ought to live according to 
God" means that man should live according to the revelation of God. Man 
can reach or know God, but he cannot fully comprehend Him. Human 
finiteness is inevitable even in the most profound capability of the 
transcendent spirit of man. True knowledge of God is only possible from His 
own revelation given to man. Although Niebuhr does not clearly express 
this point, this conviction of Augustine is crucial in the way it is reflected in 
the exclusive importance of the special revelation of Christ for salvation in 
Niebuhr's theology.13 Right understanding of character of God is of him who 
is merciful and at the same time righteous on the final judgement of man. 
Even the transcendent spirit of man cannot reach this truth, but only the 
revelation of Christ on the Cross revealed it to man. 
12 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 157-58. (ellipses original). 
Quotations are from his quotation from Przywara, Augustine Synthesis, p. 23, of 
Retract., I, i, 2 and Niebuhr's is from Serm. (de script. N. T.), CXVII, iii, 5. 
13 See Revelation and J-listory in chapter 1, 14ff, 19ff. 
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In sum, Niebuhr took the following points from Augustine's 
understanding of the image of God: self-determination and self-
transcendence of the human spirit, reason not in the Hellenistic sense of 
forming concepts, and the spirit's capability to reach God but incapability 
to comprehend Him. 
Niebuhr ascribes the consistent interpretation of spiritual 
transcendence as the essential part of the image of God in man in Christian 
theology to Augustine's doctrine of the image of God. Niebuhr cites Calvin's 
understanding of the image of God and pointed out its succession of 
Augustine's doctrine: 
Calvin makes clear that by the reason of the soul he means 
capacities which include the self-determination of the will and 
the quality of transcendence which Augustine has analysed: 
"God hath furnished the soul of man with a mind capable of 
discerning good from evil, just from unjust; and of discovering 
by the light of reason what ought to be pursued and avoided. . . . 
To this He hath annexed the will on which depends the choice. 
The primitive condition of man was ennobled with those 
eminent faculties; he possessed reason, understanding, 
prudence and judgment not only for the government of his life 
upon earth but to enable him to ascend even to God and 
eternal felicity.”14 
Such an understanding of self-transcendence of the human spirit as 
the image of God, articulated by Augustine and his tradition, gives Niebuhr 
" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 159. (ellipses original). The 
quotation is from the Institutes, Book I, ch. 15, par. 8. Niebuhr regards Calvin as an 
Augutinian at the time of the Reformation. By contrast, the other major figure of the 
Reformation, Martin Luther, is not presented as an Augutinian with respect to his 
view of the image of God. The image of God having been lost was so stongly 
emphasised in Luther's thought that the image of God is described mostly to express 
the opposite of the sinful and miserable nature of man. 
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the theological core around which to establish his persuasive and total 
cohesion between other doctrines in his theological system (for example, 
anthropology and the doctrine of sin, anthropology and the doctrine of 
history, anthropology and the doctrine of ethics). In this sense, his theology 
is an anthropological theology. 
In terms of the controversial issue of dialecticism with respect to the 
continuity or discontinuity between the eternal and the temporal, 
identifying the self-transcendental character of the spirit as the image of 
God is crucial. This is because those like Niebuhr who seek a balance of 
continuity and discontinuity on the one hand can criticize neo-orthodoxy's 
emphasis on discontinuity, and on the other gain a foundation to stress 
continuity. Naturally Barth, who following Kierkegaard agrees with the 
self-transcendence of the human spirit, disagrees with identifying the spirit 
with image of God. Indeed, he severely criticizes Augustine's understanding 
of the image of God.'5 In Barth's case, his conviction of the discontinuity 
between God and man is so firm that even the amazing profundity of man's 
spirit, which he himself cannot comprehend, is still in finite man. In 
Niebuhr's case, this profundity of the incomprehensible spirit of man is 
attributed to God. 
Next, Niebuhr brings forward the insightful understanding of the 
self-determination and self-transcendence of human nature by Max 
is Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 158, footnote 14. 
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Scheler (1874-1928), German social and religious philosopher, and 
comments on it. 
"The nature of man," he declares, "and that which could be 
termed his unique quality transcend that which is usually 
called intelligence and freedom of choice and would not be 
reached if his intelligence and freedom could conceivably be 
raised to the nth degree. . . . Between an intelligent monkey 
and an Edison, merely as technical intelligence, only a 
difference of degree, though a great degree, exists. It is the 
quality of the human spirit on the other hand to lift itself above 
itself as living organism and to make the whole temporal and 
spatial world, including itself, the object of its knowledge." 
The freedom of which Scheler speaks is something more 
(and in a sense also something less) than the usual "freedom of 
choice" so important in philosophical and theological theory. 
Man is self-determining not only in the sense that he 
transcends natural process in such a way as to be able to 
choose between various alternatives presented to him by the 
processes of nature but also in the sense that he transcends 
himself in such a way that he must choose his total end. In this 
task of self-determination he is confronted with endless 
potentialities and he can set no limit to what he ought to be, 
short of the character of ultimate reality. Yet this same man is 
a creature whose life is definitely limited by nature and he is 
unable to choose anything beyond the bounds set by the 
creation in which he stands.' 
In these words, Niebuhr focuses on the issue of man's freedom and 
limitation. Because of spiritual transcendence, not only can man stand 
above the flux of natural process, but he can also transcend himself. To be 
the man who he should be, man faces the existential challenge with his 
unlimited possibility. While the relationship between the limitation of man 
as creature and nature will be treated in the next section, Niebuhr's 
16 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 162-63. Quotation from Max 
Scheler, Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, 46-47. Cf. Brunner, Man in Revolt, 92. 
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concern here is the problem of limitation of man's freedom and 
transcendence. 
Implicit in the human situation of freedom and in man's 
capacity to transcend himself and his world is his inability to 
construct a world of meaning without finding a source and key 
to the structure of meaning which transcends the world 
beyond his own capacity to transcend it. The problem of 
meaning, which is the basic problem of religion, transcends the 
ordinary rational problem of tracing the relation of things to 
each other as the freedom of man's spirit transcends his 
rational faculties.'' 
It is very true that transcendental man can stand in a higher world of 
meaning over himself, but he does not have a principle of meaning which 
stands over that world of meaning to interpret it. Man can stand over 
himself, but does not know whether the sense he makes by his self-
determination for the fulfillment of life is right or wrong. The supposed 
principles available for man to use in interpreting the world of meaning are 
only those which he rationally conceives; otherwise man just follows his 
own natural vitality. But these are not the ultimate principle of coherence 
and meaning. For example, the effort to identify meaning with rationality is 
a deification of reason.I8 This is the inevitable condition of man who is 
spiritually infinite and, at the same time, finite. Niebuhr sees a strong 
possibility for man to fall into idolatry in such a situation. 
17 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 164. Man is incapable of 
gaining the vantage point of comprehending the meaning of history, Niebuhr, Faith 
and History, 116. 
18 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 164-65. 
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Though the religious faith through which God is apprehended 
cannot be in contradiction to reason in the sense that the 
ultimate principle of meaning cannot be in contradiction to the 
subordinate principle of meaning which is found in rational 
coherence yet, on the other hand religious faith cannot be 
simply subordinated to reason or made to stand under its 
judgment. When this is done the reason which asks the 
question whether the God of religious faith is plausible has 
already implied a negative answer in the question because it 
has made itself God and naturally cannot tolerate another.' 
Man is tempted and falls into the sin of idolatry in his self-
transcendence and finiteness. Niebuhr thinks that man has to navigate 
between the Charybdis of life-denial and acosmism in the effort to escape 
the Scylla of idolatry.' Man can make only one of two choices: the idolatry 
of putting contingent human thought or vitality on the throne of 
unconditional principle of meaning, or a denial of whole temporal existence. 
According to Niebuhr, man in the image of God has such a spiritual 
infiniteness, but it comes with the finiteness of man as creature. The 
tension which exists in this dialectic situation of man's spiritual 
infiniteness as the image of God and his creaturely finiteness is the location 
of sin in man. In other words, without the image of God in man, he could 
not sin because without the image man does not have any thing upon 
which to rely to see the spiritual reality of God and his own relationship 
with Him. 
'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 165-66. 
" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 166. 
34 
Niebuhr's conviction is that a Christian paradoxical approach to the 
problem of the freedom and finiteness of man is the only resolution. For 
that resolution he believes that it is necessary to set the doctrine of man as 
creature in juxtaposition to the doctrine of man as image of God. 21  
Man as creature 
In the previous section, the counterpart of spiritual transcendence, 
namely the finiteness of creatureliness, was briefly discussed. Without a 
right comprehension of the finiteness of man there is no right 
understanding of sin. 
Niebuhr proclaims the Christian view of the goodness of God's 
creation and surveys it through citations of Scripture, along with his 
comments. 
The goodness of creation by God is clearly stated in Gen. 1:31 and 
other passages. In the biblical interpretation, the created world, which is 
dependent and contingent, is finite but not evil. In Hellenistic thought and 
other religions, the world, physical and temporal, is finite and thus is evil. 
Such a view of the world is foreign to the biblical teaching. The physical and 
temporal body is finite but not evil nor the source of sin in man. The lack of 
human comprehension of the totality of the world at an unconditional 
interpretation level is not because man's finite individuality is evil. 
'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 166, Carnell, The Theology of 
Reinhold Niebuhr, 64. 
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The finiteness, dependence, and insufficiency of mortal man are 
ordained by the holy God's plan and providence, so they should be received 
humbly. In the Bible, man's brevity and finiteness are for glorifying the 
majesty and eternity of God.22  
Evil appears when the fragmented or finite existence of man seeks to 
comprehend the whole by his wisdom or pretends to realize it. Concerning 
this problem of evil, the Bible testifies that God's will and wisdom transcend 
human interpretation of the meaning of the world and of life. And besides 
being beyond human abilities of comprehension, God's will and wisdom 
comprehend and reign over the world in perfect harmony." 
Niebuhr also pointed out the relationship between the dependent, 
finite character of man and of sin, quoting one of his key passages from the 
Bible to understand sin, 'Therefore I say unto you be not anxious." He 
thinks that this passage means that the finiteness and weakness of man 
does not lead to sin, but that man's anxiety does.24 
Thus after surveying the Biblical teaching of the finiteness of man, 
Niebuhr summarizes it as follows: 
It is important to recognize how basic the Christian doctrine of 
22 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 167-68. Isa. 40 is cited for 
the contrast between man's brevity and God's majesty. 
'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 168. Job 42 is cited for man's 
inability to comprehend God's comprehension of the whole with his wisdom. 
24 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 168. Mt. 6:25. The 
relationship between anxiety and sin will be fully considered in chapter 3. 
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the goodness of creation is for a conception of man in which 
human finiteness is emphasized but not deprecated. In the 
Biblical view the contrast between the created world and the 
Creator, between its dependent and insufficient existence and 
His freedom and self-sufficiency, is absolute. But this contrast 
never means that the created world is evil by reason of the 
particularization and individualization of its various types of 
existence. It is never a corruption of an original divine unity 
and eternity, as in neo-Platonism; nor is it evil because of the 
desire and pain which characterize all insufficient and 
dependent life, as in Buddhism.' 
Clarifying the general understanding of the goodness of the creature, 
Niebuhr focuses on the Christian concept of individuality. 
The individual is conceived of as a creature of infinite 
possibilities which cannot be fulfilled within terms of this 
temporal existence. But his salvation never means the 
complete destruction of his creatureliness and absorption into 
the divine. On the other hand, though finite individuality is 
never regarded as of itself evil, its finiteness, including the 
finiteness of the mind, is never obscured.' 
In the Christian concept of individuality, the presupposition of faith 
is key to living with the paradoxical or dialectical situation of man. For 
navigating between Charybdis and Scylla, man needs faith. Man as an 
existential individual has to live "here and now" to seek the highest 
realization of his self by faith. Niebuhr quotes Kierkegaard's description of 
the existential life of the individual self as the most accurate one of the true 
meaning of human selfhood. 
"The determining factor in the self is consciousness, i.e. self- 
25 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 169. 
26 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 170. 
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consciousness. The more consciousness, the more self; the 
more consciousness the more will; the more will, the more 
self. . . . The self is the conscious synthesis of the limited and 
the unlimited which is related to itself and the task of which is 
to become a self, a task which can be realized only in relation to 
God. To become a self means to become concrete. But to 
become concrete means to be neither limited nor unlimited, for 
that which must become concrete is a synthesis. Therefore 
development consists in this: that in the eternalization of the 
self one escapes the self endlessly and in the temporalization of 
the self one endlessly returns to the self."' 
Niebuhr adopts Kierkegaard's existential condition of man who 
unceasingly seeks the highest self or fulfills his life in the process of history 
with the faith of hope. In the dialectic condition of humans' infinite freedom 
and finite creatureliness as elucidated by Niebuhr, unceasing endeavor is 
inevitable because Niebuhr presupposes the discontinuity of eternity and 
time. According to this discontinuity, even the omnipotent and omniscient 
God could not realize the individual self in history because the 
discontinuity of the eternal and the temporal is absolute. Only faith in God 
gives man the hope in God who will complete man's unceasing endeavor for 
realization of the highest self beyond history. 
Adding to his presentation of the Biblical teaching of the goodness of 
creation, Niebuhr gives historical examples of inconsistencies of this 
teaching in church history. 
One must not claim that Christian thought and life have 
consistently preserved the Biblical insights on the basic 
27 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 171. (ellipses original). The 
quotation is from Kierkegaard's Die Krankheit zum Tode (Diederich Verlag), 27. 
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character and the essential goodness of the finiteness, 
dependence and insufficiency of the self. On the contrary 
Christianity from the very beginning incorporated some of the 
errors of idealism and mysticism, including their mistaken 
estimates of the human situation, into its own thought; and 
has never completely expelled them.' 
Pre-Augustine theologians, especially the Platonist Origen, thought 
the preexistent deficiency of man was judged by God with the judgement of 
mutability and finiteness. Sex was a particular symbol of sin, because it 
indicates the incompleteness of man without others. The influence of this 
interpretation of man's finiteness as sin still exists in Greek theology.' 
The identification of sin and evil with the mutability of the 
temporal world and with the ignorance of the finite mind is very 
general in the pre-Augustinian period of Christianity.' 
Niebuhr cites the examples of Justin Martyr, Clement, Gregory of 
Nyssa and Irenaeus the show the strong influence of Hellenism in their 
theology on man and says: 
On its Hellenistic side, Christianity exhibits many similarities 
with the Greek cults of immortality and the mystery religions. 
Salvation is frequently defined as the ultimate deification of 
man, through Christ's conquest of human mortality.' 
Niebuhr responds to the influence of the Hellenistic idea of finiteness 
and mortality as sin with the Biblical teaching. He admits the relation of 
28 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 171. 
'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 171-72. 
3° Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 172. 
31 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 173. 
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mortality and sin. But it is in the sense of "death came by sin," or death as 
the result of sin, not sin as the result of death. In Pauline usage of death, it 
does not always denote physical death but often symbolizes spiritual death 
(Eph. 2:1). Furthermore, "the sting of death" (1 Cor. 15:56) does not makes 
sense as physical death. So the Hellenistic idea of sin as a result of 
mortality is not supported by the Biblical usage. On the contrary, the 
Biblical view of the relation of sin to mortality accords with these uses: 
In this view mortality, insecurity and dependence are not of 
themselves evil but become the occasion of evil when man 
seeks in his pride to hide his mortality, to overcome his 
insecurity by his own power and to establish his independence. 
The ideal possibility would be that a man of perfect faith would 
not fear death because of his confidence that "neither life nor 
death . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God 
which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." But since unbelief is the 
very basis of sin, it is impossible for sinful man to anticipate his 
end with equanimity. Thus sin is "the sting of death"; and the 
obvious mark of that sting is fear." 
Niebuhr believes that the best interpretation is to see the finiteness of man, 
mortality, insecurity and dependence as the occasion of sin. 
Returning to the Pauline usage of "death," first Niebuhr presents 
Paul's understanding of death (physical death) as a consequence of Adam's 
sin.' Niebuhr explains that, according to one understanding of Paul, God's 
words of curse on Adam, "for dust thou art," is a statement of fact, not a 
promise of future punishment, whereas the concluding words, "and to dust 
32 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 174. (ellipses original). 
33 Niebuhr thinks that Paul's interpretation on this was influenced by the 
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shalt thou return," carry an implication of future punishment. This means 
that mortal man (originally) would have not returned to dust if Adam had 
not sinned, but because of his sin he received the fate of physical death. 
Therefore, the mortal life of Adam was supposed to be a transcendent 
mortal life. ' This interpretation is dominant in orthodox Christianity. 
Niebuhr, however, considers this interpretation to contain serious 
problems with regard to the relationship between finiteness and sin in man. 
Such an interpretation obscures man's organic relation to 
nature and could be made meaningful only if it were assumed 
that sin had introduced death into the whole of nature. But 
such an assumption becomes almost identical with the 
Hellenistic belief that nature and finiteness are themselves evil. 
The orthodox doctrine, rooted in Pauline theology, therefore 
has affinities with Hellenistic dualism, despite the important 
distinction that it regards death as the consequence of sin and 
not sin as the consequence of death.' 
Thus Niebuhr makes the point that, even though orthodoxy's 
understanding of the relationship between sin and death is the opposite of 
Hellenism, orthodoxy's understanding of the character of physical death, of 
mortality, and of the destruction of man's original transcendence of 
mortality as realities that were not originally supposed to exist expresses a 
sinfulness inherent to them, which is an understanding of mortality as 
rabbinic teaching of his day. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 174. 
34 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 174-75. 
' Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 175-76. Niebuhr cited 
examples of transcendental mortality of various theologians in Christian history. The 
Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 176, footnote 14. 
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sinful that resembles a Hellenistic position. This orthodox interpretation of 
physical death seriously jeopardizes the Biblical teaching of finiteness that 
illustrates God's majesty by contrasting it with the weakness and 
dependence of man as creature. 
From our observation of his contention with orthodox interpretation, 
we can conclude that Niebuhr believes that the Biblical view of death is 
spiritual death instead of a physical death that shares the Hellenistic idea 
of sinful finiteness. Sin should not be ascribed to temporality but to the 
willful refusal of man to know the finite and determined situation of his 
existence. 
We can thus summarize Niebuhr's understanding of the Biblical view 
of man that has been discussed in this chapter. The image of God in man is 
the height of self-transcendence in man's spirituality. Man as creature is 
involved in the necessities and contingencies of the natural world, but his 
finiteness is not the source of sin in him. Put more positively, man is a 
synthesis of the image of God and of creature. 
In its purest form the Christian view of man regards man as a unity of 
God-likeness and creatureliness, in which unity he remains a creature even 
in the highest spiritual dimensions of his existence, and also may reveal 
elements of the image of God even in the lowliest aspects of his natural 
life .36 
36 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 150. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DOCTRINE OF SIN 
The importance of the doctrine of sin in Niebuhr's thought is well 
known.' It can be considered that the doctrine of sin is the center of 
Niebuhr's theology. However, it is also true that his doctrine of sin does not 
stand by itself. The tightness of the relationship between the doctrine of sin 
and the doctrine of man is more than that between the doctrine of sin and 
the doctrine of salvation in his thought. The relation between sin and 
salvation is natural: the logical flow is to talk about salvation after the 
clarification of sin, and the content of the former is the opposite of the latter. 
But in the case of the doctrine of man and that of sin, the doctrine of man is 
foundational to that of sin. Without a proper understanding of man, it is 
impossible to grasp the right understanding of human sin. Therefore, 
anthropology and the doctrine of sin are to be considered as a set, 
especially for the doctrine of sin, in Niebuhr's theology. Indeed, Niebuhr 
attempts to interpret the origin of sin by looking psychologically at actual 
sin from the anthropology described above. 
' Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 247, Whitney Jennings Oates, 
Basic Writings of Saint Augustine, vol. 1 (New York: Random House, 1948), xii, John 
Leo Flynn, Justification: A Comparison of the Doctrine of Reinhold Niebuhr with the 
Doctrine of the Council of Trent (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1970), 7-8, and so 
forth. 
Even though Niebuhr's doctrine of sin is the main theme in most of 
his works, his concern is not the sin of individual men, but rather social sin. 
However, in seeing the relationship between individual and collective sin, 
Niebuhr started with study of individual sin as the origin of collective sin.2 
Another characteristic of his treatment of the doctrine of sin should be 
mentioned here. Like Kierkegaard and Barth, Niebuhr does not approach 
human sin from either an ontological-philosophical or an ontological-
theological perspective. Instead of these, he approaches it with a 
psychological analysis. In other words, Niebuhr's theological interest is not 
"what is sin or the origin of sin?" but "how is sin related to man's spirit or 
conscience?"' 
From his writings, it is very clear that, as an accepted definition, 
Niebuhr shares a theologically orthodox understanding of human sin. 
The religious dimension of sin is man's rebellion against God, 
his effort to usurp the place of God. The moral and social 
dimension of sin is injustice.' 
Similarly, 
Sin is, in short, the consequence of man's inclination to usurp 
the prerogatives of God, to think more highly of himself than he 
ought to think, thus making destructive use of his freedom by 
not observing the limits to which a creaturely freedom is 
2 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 208. 
3 Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 187. 
' Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 179. 
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bound.' 
Sin is confessed rebellion against God and usurpation of the place of 
God, in other words the self-centeredness of man. Though such an 
authentic theological definition or similar kinds often appear in his works, 
Niebuhr does not develop them any further. For Niebuhr, the theological 
confessional stance regarding the nature of sin by traditional Christianity 
is presupposed, though he often criticizes and reconstructs traditional 
doctrines. 
To grasp the fact of Niebuhr's confession of the basic understanding 
of sin as man's rebellion against God is crucial. In liberalism, sin is not 
seriously considered, but instead is eliminated by an optimistic view of man 
as essentially good. They see the problem of evil in events in history.' The 
immanent theology of liberalism finds the divine in man, so it only seeks 
the cause of evil outside of man. Also, a liberalism which presupposes the 
radical freedom of man cannot assume a radical defect in man.' As a 
Christian Realist, Niebuhr accepts the confession of man as sinner, which 
5 Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1949), 121. 
6 Ronald H. Stone, Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians (Nashville: Abingdon 
Press, 1972), 95. 
' Stone, Reinhold Niebuhr, 100, describes Niebuhr's approach to keeping man's 
radical spiritual freedom as avoiding a consistent understanding of Augustinianism 
and Plagianism. 
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explains the reality of man and society.' Now he asks his pragmatic 
question, How does sin affect the human heart and conscience? 
Anxiety as precondition of sin 
In this section, Niebuhr's unique doctrine of sin will be examined. He 
utilizes the Fall story in Genesis 3 to analyze how sin occurs in man 
psychologically. 
In the Fall story, Niebuhr first points out that the serpent tempted 
man with its false interpretation of the human situation. The serpent 
offered the interpretation that God as a jealous God and feared man to be 
like Him through eating the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. 
The temptation lies in man's situation of finiteness and freedom.9 
There are two elements in this point. The one is temptation and the 
other is the human situation. The occurrence of sin needs a false 
interpretation—or more basically there is the devil who tempted man. 
Niebuhr summarizes the two points of Biblical satanology. 
(1) the devil is not thought of as having been created evil. 
Rather his evil arises from his effort to transgress the bounds 
set for his life, an effort which places him in rebellion against 
8 It is interesting that in Niebuhr's thought we see the minimum presupposition 
of ontology, namely, man (his spirit and body) and God. But the case of Satan, or the 
devil, is ambiguous. Niebuhr is concerned with the seriousness of sin and evil in the 
human will or heart, but he does not discuss the devil as an angelic figure in reality. 
This is deeply related to his understanding of the Scriptures as myths or symbols. See 
his treatment of the Fall story in Genesis. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 
1, 179-86, 253-54. 
9 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 180. 
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God. (2) The devil fell before man fell, which is to say that man's 
rebellion against God is not an act of sheer perversity, nor does 
it follow inevitably from the situation in which he stands.' 
Here Niebuhr indicates that there was a tempter, the devil, who 
sinned against God before his temptation of man; hence, the very beginning 
of man's sin was not in him. On the side of man, there was a source which 
reacted to the temptation. That is the dialectical situation of man's 
finiteness and freedom." 
It [false interpretation] is suggested to man by a force of evil 
which precedes his own sin. Perhaps the best description or 
definition of this mystery is the statement that sin posits itself, 
that there is no situation in which it is possible to say that sin 
is either an inevitable consequence of the situation nor yet that 
it is an act of sheer and perverse individual defiance of God.' 
The necessity of sin before sin and the reaction of man who was in a unique 
spiritual condition both need to be considered to interpret the Fall story 
properly. 
Insofar as human nature is characterized by physical finiteness, it 
belongs to the temporal realm. However, man also has his spiritual freedom 
and the possibility to be transcendent as the image of God. 
Niebuhr describes the situation of anxiety in the dialectical condition 
with a metaphor. 
1° Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 180. 
11 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 180. 
12 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 181. The idea of "sin posits 
itself" is obviously from Soren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, trans Reidar 
Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 113. 
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It [anxiety] is the condition of the sailor, climbing the mast (to 
use a simile), with the abyss of the waves beneath him and the 
"crow's nest" above him. He is anxious about both the end 
toward which he strives and the abyss of nothingness into 
which he may fall.' 
In such a psychological situation man is tempted to sin. Although 
man endeavors as much as possible to fulfill the self-transcendent 
character, he always has to face the fact that his capability is limited and 
bound as a creature. At such a moment, there is a chance for temptation to 
insinuate into man's heart to lead him to sin. When man thinks of himself 
within nature and history, he seems to be capable of expanding his life with 
spiritual transcendence, escaping from the bonds of the contingencies of 
nature. To secure his life of spiritual freedom, he needs to ignore the bonds 
of nature and pretend that he can be infinite and spiritual—although he 
really has limits as a creature. Man's synthesis of his infinite, free spirit and 
his finite body is not static but inherently possesses a dynamic and 
contradicting tension. The condition of this human situation is expressed 
by Niebuhr as follows: 
In short, man, being both free and bound, both limited 
and limitless, is anxious. Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant 
of the paradox of freedom and finiteness in which man is 
involved. Anxiety is the internal precondition of sin. It is the 
inevitable spiritual state of man, standing in the paradoxical 
situation of freedom and finite-ness.14 
13 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 185. 
14 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 182. 
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The human condition of anxiety is concomitant to the dialectical 
human condition and internal precondition of sin. Anxiety is the source 
that has the possibility to react to temptation, or even becomes temptation. 
Anxiety itself is not sin. 
In that Niebuhr saw temptation as the only inclination of man to be 
led to sin, he saw the line of anxiety, temptation, and sin as the process of 
sinning. There is thus always for man a choice of faith to purge anxiety of 
the tendency toward sinful self-assertion. 
The ideal possibility is that faith in the ultimate security of 
God's love would overcome all immediate insecurities of nature 
and history. That is why Christian orthodoxy has consistently 
defined unbelief as the root of sin, or as the sin which precedes 
pride. It is significant that Jesus justifies his injunction, "Be 
not anxious" with the observation, "For your heavenly Father 
knoweth that ye have need of these things." The freedom from 
anxiety which he enjoins is a possibility only if perfect trust in 
divine security has been achieved.' 
Trust in God's love and perfect security by faith is the only right way 
for man. In the case of Eve in the Fall story, she was in anxiety over the 
dialectic situation and was tempted by the false interpretation which 
encouraged her to pretend to be able to be infinite and secure her life by 
becoming like God. 
Thus, according to Niebuhr, the cause of sin is anxiety, which in turn 
is attributed to the paradoxical condition of man: the possibility of being 
is Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 183. See also Stone, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, 97. 
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spiritual-infinite and man's finiteness as creature. Only when sin is posited 
before the sin which man commits, the anxiety turns to be a temptation. In 
other words, the decision of man in anxiety accuses his responsibility, and 
the fact of his being tempted does not agree fully with the idea of man's 
sinful nature underlying his actions.' 
In Niebuhr's theology of sin, the concept of anxiety is indispensable. 
With the understanding of anxiety as a concomitant reality to the 
dialectical human structure, capturing the reality of the human struggle 
through a psychological analysis of the swaying of the human heart is given 
more light for its understanding. This way of analyzing human sin is 
unique and gives additional understanding to the conventional theology 
regarding sin. 
Niebuhr's analysis of anxiety is basically done in the context of the 
Fall story in Genesis. According to his interpretation, Adam had anxiety in 
the Garden of Eden. It seems that this position is very different from the 
traditional Christian understanding. It is thus hard to believe that Adam 
was beset by a spiritually unstable anxiety in his perfection. For this 
difficulty it should be recognized that Niebuhr utilizes the Fall story of 
Adam to explain the anxiety of man in general. In other words, Niebuhr 
does not see any difference between the psychological condition of Adam 
and that of man in general. This identification of man in general and Adam 
16 This issue will be discussed more fully later. 
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is derived from Niebuhr's understanding of the Fall story as a myth. 
The myth of the Fall of Adam universalizes, as well as 
individualizes, this theme of man's revolt against God. The 
influence of this myth upon the Christian imagination is not 
primarily due to any literalistic illusions of Christian orthodoxy. 
The myth accurately symbolizes the consistent Biblical 
diagnosis of moral and historical evil. Adam and, together with 
him, all men seek to overstep the bounds which are set by the 
Creator for man as creature.' 
Thus, Niebuhr's elucidation of anxiety and sin are for general man.' 
In addition to a description of Niebuhr's understanding of the relation 
between anxiety and sin, it should be mentioned that this theological 
approach to sin is not Niebuhr's own original one. He himself admits that 
the idea of anxiety as a psychological condition of sin is from Kierkegaard. 
In fact, he refers to and cites Kierkegaard's work and praises his analysis of 
the relation of anxiety to sin as the most profound in Christian thought.19 
Kierkegaard sees man as a synthesis of two elements which 
contradict each other. 
The synthesis of the temporal and the eternal is not 
another synthesis but is the expression for the first synthesis, 
according to which man is a synthesis of psyche and body that 
is sustained by spirit. As soon as the spirit is posited, the 
moment is present.2°  
17 Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History, 121-22, cf. Beyond Tragedy, 10, The 
Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 279. 
18 His understanding of the original condition of man will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
18 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 182, footnote 2. 
20 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 88. 
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In Kierkegaard's thought, man is a synthesis of the eternal and the 
temporal, namely, psyche and body with the sustenance of spirit. The 
interesting thing is that there is spirit as the third factor, which plays a 
significant role for the unity of the dialectic poles. If spirit is not closely 
related to the dialectical relationship, an immediate unity within man's 
natural condition becomes possible.21 Niebuhr changes Kierkegaard's 
trichotomical treatment of man into a dichotomical one. This is because of 
Niebuhr's conviction of the Biblical view of man as a unity of spirit and 
body.' At a glance, in Kierkegaard's thought, although it is ambiguous 
which factor of man is related with eternity, the spirit is attributed to the 
eternal element. So Niebuhr's assimilation of psyche into spirit is justified 
by keeping the significance of spirit in his use of "spirit," which has the 
capability of a super-rational reality for man's spirituality. Thus Niebuhr's 
basic structure of anthropology drew heavily from Kierkegaard's. 
As already mentioned above, the idea of the relation of anxiety to sin 
is also from Kierkegaard. The related understandings of the role of anxiety 
in sin, "sin posits itself' and "sin as qualitative leap,"23 were also accepted 
and utilized. Even so, Kierkegaard's psychological analysis of anxiety is 
much more thorough than Niebuhr's. Kierkegaard's existential concern 
21 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 41. 
22 See chapter 2. 
23 Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 33. See also Niebuhr, The Nature and 
Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 254. 
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makes his search into the human heart profoundly deep. On the other 
hand, Niebuhr's concern over social sin makes him apply the insight of the 
relation of anxiety to sin in the individual to the collective level. Precisely at 
this point lies the uniqueness and significance of Niebuhr's theology. 
In addition, with such a difference in direction of theological concern 
between them, Niebuhr came to have a broader view of anxiety than 
Kierkegaard. Within Kierkegaard's analysis, anxiety is only related to sin in 
a destructive sense, such as in the following: 
(c) The posited sin is an unwarranted actuality. It is 
actuality, and it is posited by the individual as actuality in 
repentance, but repentance does not become the individual's 
freedom. Repentance is reduced to a possibility in relation to 
sin; in other words, repentance cannot cancel sin, it can only 
sorrow over it. Sin advances in its consequence; repentance 
follows it step by step, but always a moment too late. It forces 
itself to look at the dreadful, but like the mad King Lear (0 du 
zertrummert Meisterstfick der Schopfung [0 thou ruined 
masterpiece of nature]) it has lost the reins of government, and 
it has retained only the power to grieve. At this point, anxiety is 
at its highest. Repentance has lost its mind, and anxiety is 
potentiated into repentance. The consequence of sin moves on; 
it drags the individual along like a woman whom the 
executioner drags by the hair while she screams in despair. 
Anxiety is ahead; it discovers the consequence before it comes, 
as one feels in one's bones that a storm is approaching. The 
consequence comes closer; the individual trembles like a horse 
that gasps as it comes to a halt at the place where once it had 
been frightened. Sin conquers.' 
Niebuhr agrees with Kierkegaard's description of anxiety's 
destructive relation to sin. But he discerns anxiety as the mother of 
' Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 115. 
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cultural creativity as well.25  This emphasis of another facet of anxiety is 
crucial for Niebuhr to develop in order to understand and judge history as 
the self-redemptive work of man.26 Niebuhr says: 
Yet anxiety is not sin. It must be distinguished from sin 
partly because it is its precondition and not its actuality, and 
partly because it is the basis of all human creativity as well as 
the precondition of sin. Man is anxious not only because his 
life is limited and dependent and yet not so limited that he does 
not know of his limitations. He is also anxious because he does 
not know the limits of his possibilities. He can do nothing and 
regard it perfectly done, because higher possibilities are 
revealed in each achievement. All human actions stand under 
seemingly limitless possibilities. There are, of course, limits but 
it is difficult to gauge them from any immediate perspective. 
There is therefore no limit of achievement in any sphere of 
activity in which human history can rest with equanimity.' 
Anxiety comes from the fact that man is not aware of the limits of his 
possibilities, which drives him to unceasing endeavor to reach the higher 
level of perfection. This existential understanding of anxiety as the driving 
force of human self-realization is from Martin Heidegger.28 
To sum up, Niebuhr clarified the unstable spiritual condition of 
anxiety as the inevitable concomitant of the dialectic of man's spiritual 
25 William J Wolf, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of Man," Reinhold Niebuhr: His 
Religious, Social, and Political Thought, ed. Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Breton (New 
York: Macmillan, 1956), 239. 
26 Cultures and civilizations as achievements of human creativity will be 
examined later in this chapter. 
27 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 183. 
28 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 183, footnote 4. See also 
Stone, Reinhold Niebuhr, 96. 
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transcendence and creaturely finiteness. As the locus of man's sin, anxiety 
turns to sin when it is tempted with a false interpretation, or when sin is 
presupposed. This analysis of the core concept of sin's occurrence becomes 
the key to explain two types of sin which man commits. 
Sin as pride and sensuality 
Alongside his understanding of the anxiety of man, Niebuhr defines 
sin. 
When anxiety has conceived it brings forth both pride 
and sensuality. Man falls into pride, when he seeks to raise his 
contingent existence to unconditioned significance; he falls 
into sensuality, when he seeks to escape from his unlimited 
possibilities of freedom, from the perils and responsibilities of 
self-determination, by immersing himself into a "mutable 
good," by losing himself in some natural vitality.' 
According to Niebuhr, there are two directions for sin to take within 
the dialectical condition of man. One is the way of pride, which is derived 
from excessive confidence in man's transcendence. In this instance of sin, 
man frantically pursues the unlimited capability to exalt himself into 
perfection. Niebuhr, however, reminds us that man pursues perfection only 
while ignoring the fact of his limited capabilities.' He needs to obscure the 
limitedness or fmiteness of his capability. He pretends that he possesses 
infinite capability. This raising of himself to the level of a false, ultimate 
'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 186. 
" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 195, 196. 
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power is the sin of pride. 
Niebuhr examines three kinds of sinful pride: the pride of power, the 
pride of knowledge, and the pride of virtue. This application of his theology 
in practical form to the analysis of sins in society is Niebuhr's uniqueness 
and the reason he is held in such high regard by theologians, secular 
intellectuals, and politicians. 
Regarding the pride of power, Niebuhr says: 
Since man's insecurity arises not merely from the 
vicissitudes of nature but from the uncertainties of society and 
history, it is natural that the ego should seek to overcome 
social as well as natural insecurity and should express the 
impulse of "power over men" as well as "power over matter." 
The peril of a competing human will is overcome by 
subordinating that will to the ego and by using the power of 
many subordinated wills to ward off the enmity which such 
subordination creates. The will-to-power is thus inevitably 
involved in the vicious circle of accentuating the insecurity 
which it intends to eliminate.' 
Here one can see Niebuhr's insightful understanding of sins and their 
destructive results in modern technology and governmental authority. 
With respect to the pride of knowledge, Niebuhr says: 
All human knowledge is tainted with an "ideological" taint. It 
pretends to be more true than it is. It is finite knowledge, 
gained from a particular perspective; but it pretends to be final 
and ultimate knowledge. Exactly analogous to the cruder pride 
of power, the pride of intellect is derived on the one hand from 
ignorance of the finiteness of the human mind and on the other 
hand from an attempt to obscure the known conditioned 
character of human knowledge and the taint of self-interest in 




Intellectual pride is thus the pride of reason which 
forgets that it is involved in a temporal process and imagines 
itself in complete transcendence over history.' 
Philosophers and all kinds of scientists could be included in this 
analysis. 
Regarding the pride of virtue, Niebuhr says: 
(c) All elements of moral pride are involved in the 
intellectual pride which we have sought to analyse. In all but 
the most abstract philosophical debates the pretension of 
possessing an unconditioned truth is meant primarily to 
establish "my good" as unconditioned moral value. Moral pride 
is revealed in all "self-righteous" judgments in which the other 
is condemned because he fails to conform to the highly 
arbitrary standards of the self. Since the self judges itself by its 
own standards it finds itself good. It judges others by its own 
standards and finds them evil, when their standards fail to 
conform to its own. This is the secret of the relationship 
between cruelty and self-righteousness. . . . Moral pride is the 
pretension of finite man that his highly conditioned virtue is 
the final righteousness and that his very relative moral 
standards are absolute.' 
This sinful pride can be found not only in all ethical systems and 
religions, but also in all human actions and thoughts. 
Niebuhr's analysis of human history as the accumulation of man's 
achievements is thoroughly informed by the perspective of pride as sin. 
32 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 194-95. 
33 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 195. 
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 199 (ellipses added). 
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Because of his interest of social or cultural sin, the sin of pride is 
emphasized and utilized more than the sin of sensuality, which is described 
next. 
Niebuhr succinctly presents the sin of sensuality, comparing it with 
the sin of pride as follows: 
Sometimes man seeks to solve the problem of the 
contradiction of finiteness and freedom, not by seeking to hide 
his finiteness and comprehending the world into himself, but 
by seeking to hide his freedom and by losing himself in some 
aspect of the world's vitalities. In that case his sin may be 
defined as sensuality rather than pride. Sensuality is never the 
mere expression of natural impulse in man. It always betrays 
some aspect of his abortive effort to solve the problem of 
finiteness and freedom. Human passions are always 
characterized by unlimited and demonic potencies of which 
animal life is innocent.35 
It is significant to realize that Niebuhr defines the sin of sensuality 
in the context of losing oneself, corresponding to establishing oneself as the 
sin of pride. Niebuhr came to this definition through reviewing and 
contenting with the understanding of sensuality in Christian theology. 
First, Niebuhr starts with the fact that the understanding of 
sensuality in Hellenistic theology is different from that of traditional 
Western theology. 
As represented by Origen's understanding of original sin, Hellenistic 
' Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 179. Niebuhr's term 
"vitalities" is used in a naturalist sense, like Nietzsche's. Vitalities are Dionysian 
irrational dynamisms of reality in nature, as opposed to Apollonian static rationality of 
the world of truth in Ancient Greek tragedy. Thus "sensuality," which is related to 
natural matter and contrasts itself with heavenly truth, can be identified with the 
Biblical term "worldly matter." 
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theologians understand original sin to be a physical infection of Eve by the 
serpent, which became the origin of all actual sins of man. Under the 
influence of Greek thought, Hellenistic Christianity has had the inclination 
to see love of pleasure as original sin, and this inherited corruption of man 
became his nature.' Hence sin as sensuality is the nature of man. Niebuhr 
does not agree with this understanding. Instead, he positively appraises the 
understanding of sensuality within Western tradition. 
In Western tradition, sensuality is understood to be the result of 
man's rebellious disobedience of God. Even though the term concupiscent is 
used, this is the result of the more primal sin of self-love. "Sensuality 
represents a further confusion consequent upon the original confusion of 
substituting the self for God as the centre of existence."' Sensuality is not 
from the natural inclinations of the physical life. 
While Niebuhr supports the side of Western tradition that denies the 
idea of sensuality as primary sin and is man's natural inclination, he still is 
not satisfied with the relation between sensuality and self-love. To him 
sensuality seems to be not the only sin caused by self-love. 
Is sensuality, in other words, a form of idolatry which makes 
the self god; or is it an alternative idolatry in which the self, 
conscious of the inadequacy of its self-worship, seeks escape 
by finding some other god?38 
36 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 229-30. 
37 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 233. 
38 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 233. 
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In this question he senses the difficulty of seeing sensuality as the 
apparent sin of self-love or self-centeredness of man as the Western 
Christian tradition thinks. For Niebuhr this sin is not only something that 
comes from without to man, but also a sin which man commits, directed 
outward from himself to something else. This mutual direction between 
man and the object of his sinful desire is important for Niebuhr. He believes 
that his understanding of the dialectic condition of man will provide a much 
clearer picture of the meaning of sin as sensuality. 
The sexual, as every other physical, impulse in man is subject 
to and compounded with the freedom of man's spirit. It is not 
something which man could conceivably leave imbedded in 
some natural harmony of animal impulses. Its force reaches up 
into the highest pinnacles of human spirituality; and the 
insecurity of man in the heights of his freedom reaches down to 
the sex impulse as an instrument of compensation and as an 
avenue of escape.' 
Here the positive meaning of sex and man's other physical impulses, 
together with his spiritual freedom, is discerned from the sexual passions of 
animal nature. The sinfulness involved in this act of man consists of using 
the sexual impulse as a way of escaping his insecurity, instead of the 
possibility of reaching his spiritual highest point. The formula of sin 
presented above is effectively applied here, too. 
His generalized sinful characteristics of sensuality are: 
(1) an extension of self-love to the point where it defeats its 
own ends; (2) an effort to escape the prison house of self by 
39 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 236. 
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finding a god in a process or person outside the self; and (3) 
finally an effort to escape from the confusion which sin has 
created into some form of subconscious existence.' 
Niebuhr's understanding of sin has been focused on sin in 
individuals. He does not describe in much detail the relationship between 
individual sin and social sin. There are some important ideas that he offers 
to think about the relationship. Though he thinks that individuals are 
moral agents and that group pride or will occurs by the claims of 
individuals, he insists on the necessity of the distinction between the 
behavior of group and individuals. 
Nevertheless some distinctions must be made between the 
collective behaviour of men and their individual attitudes. This 
is necessary in part because group pride, though having its 
source in individual attitudes, actually achieves a certain 
authority over the individual and results in unconditioned 
demands by the group upon the individual. Whenever the 
group develops organs of will, as in the apparatus of the state, 
it seems to the individual to have become an independent 
centre of moral life. He will be inclined to bow to its pretensions 
and to acquiesce in its claims of authority, even when these do 
not coincide with his moral scruples or inclinations.' 
It is interesting to see that here the deification of the ruler or officer 
who is given authority from a nation for the sake of overcoming finiteness, 
as well as a nation's giving up of its freedom to the deified authority, are 
equivalent to anxiety and the sins of pride and sensuality in an individuals' 
4° Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 240. 
41 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 208. See also Hofmann, The 
Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 190. 
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case. 
The collective self can gather enormous power and authority that is 
far greater than that of individuals. Hence much more rebellious pride 
could be realized in the organ of the will of the state. 
We can thus summarize Niebuhr's understanding of sin as follows: 
For man to escape from his anxiety that is concomitant with his own 
dialectical structure, he commits sin in either of two directions—the sin of 
pride or the sin of sensuality. In the sin of pride, man pretends to possess a 
limitless spiritual possibility to realize the higher self. In the sin of 
sensuality, man loses himself to rely on or deify some person or matter in 
the world.' 
Reconstruction of the doctrine of original sin 
After completing his psychological analysis of human sin, Niebuhr 
deliberates the problem of "inevitable but not necessary" in the doctrine of 
original sin. 
The Christian doctrine of sin in its classical form offends 
both rationalists and moralists by maintaining the seemingly 
absurd position that man sins inevitably and by a fateful 
necessity but that he is nevertheless to be held responsible for 
42 Even though Niebuhr presented his doctrine of sin as both pride and 
sensuality, his total treatment of social sin and history is based on his analysis of sin 
as pride. Regarding this point, feminist theologians contend that Niebuhr's 
overemphasis on the sin of pride is wrong because a woman tends to commit the sin of 
sensuality in which she loses her self. Some of those feminist theologians are Valerie 
Saiving Goldstein, Judith Plaskow, and Judith Vaughan. 
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actions which are prompted by an ineluctable fate.' 
If the sinful inclination of man is derived from man's sinful nature, 
his sin is a necessary result from his nature, so there is no responsibility for 
his sin. Hellenistic Christianity sees the root of sin in human physical 
nature and that the spirit of man is bound within a sinful body. But 
Western classical Christianity sees that the locus of sin is in the human will. 
Niebuhr notes that the Pauline-Augustinian tradition never loses sight of 
either sin in the human will or the inheritance of the sinful nature of 
Adam's original sin. Augustine's words about the problem with this 
position are succinctly expressed. 
Original sin, which is by definition an inherited corruption, or 
at least an inevitable one, is nevertheless not to be regarded as 
belonging to his essential nature and therefore is not outside 
the realm of his responsibility. Sin is natural for man in the 
sense that it is universal but not in the sense that it is 
necessary.4 4 
Niebuhr supports the classical form of the understanding of original 
sin, "sin as not necessary but inevitable and responsible," as the biblical 
one. He focuses the problem down further to that of human will. 
Sin is to be regarded as neither a necessity of man's 
nature nor yet as a pure caprice of his will. It proceeds rather 
from a defect of the will, for which reason it is not 'completely 
deliberate,' but since it is the will in which the defect is found 
and the will presupposes freedom the defect cannot be 
43 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 241. 
" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 242. 
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attributed to a taint in man's nature.45 
Free-will is emphasized, on the one hand, to indicate the 
responsibility of man, but enslaved-will is emphasized at the same time to 
indicate his corrupted will to choose that which is evil. 
It is logically impossible to reconcile this logical absurdity. If one 
follows the logic, he can say either that man sins with his free-will and is 
thus responsible for his sinful action or that man sins with his enslaved will, 
inherited by nature, so he could not have any choice but to sin and hence 
cannot be charged for his sinful action. 
Niebuhr offers his new approach to get a better understanding of the 
logical absurdity of original sin. He offers a psychological approach instead 
of the logical one. In his view of man's condition studied above, anxiety with 
the dialectical condition of finiteness and freedom of man is neither itself 
sin nor does it make for a sinful condition, but it can become a temptation 
when some evil element or sin comes along with it. 
Sin can never be traced merely to the temptation arising from a 
particular situation or condition in which man as man finds 
himself or in which particular men find themselves. Nor can 
the temptation which is compounded of a situation of 
finiteness and freedom, plus the fact of sin, be regarded as 
leading necessarily to sin in the life of each individual, if again 
sin is not first presupposed in that life. For this reason even the 
knowledge of inevitability does not extinguish the sense of 
responsibility.' 
'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 242. 
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 254. 
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In this psychological interpretation of sin, free-will is still found in the 
self-determining, free-will holder of the self, so the self is responsible for his 
action. Inevitability is transformed into the presupposed sin with anxiety of 
the insecurity of man's dialectical condition. Anxiety is neither stable nor a 
peaceful condition, but still itself has a neutral condition.' Furthermore, 
inevitability seems to be transformed into presupposing the existence of sin 
for sinful action to make anxiety into temptation. 
Thus, this psychological analysis of presupposed sin with the anxiety 
of man gives a better explanation of "inevitable but responsible." 
Niebuhr now returns to the classical interpretation of the doctrine of 
original sin. He sees the real problem of its interpretation in identitying 
original sin with inherited taint. 
In countering the simple moralism of the Pelagians they 
[Augustinians] insisted on interpreting original sin as an 
inherited taint. Thus they converted the doctrine of the 
inevitability of sin into a dogma which asserted that sin had a 
47 Niebuhr's interpretation of the doctrine of original sin is definitely taken from 
Kierkegaard's understanding of Adam's fall, but there is one crucial difference here 
between Niebuhr and Keirkegaard. In Kierkegaard's trichotomical interpretation, he 
assumes the state of innocence of Adam whereby Adam's spirit was sleeping or 
dreaming. When Adam sinned, his spirit was awaken by temptation and posited the 
actuality of man to be and will to be. In Niebuhr's case, he does not develop his 
interpretation of Adam's state of innocence. Theoretically at least, Kierkegaard 
develops his interpretation of Adam's fall in chronological basis. He attempts to 
establish the identity of the qualitative leap of sin by Adam with that of man in later 
generations. These facts allow us to think that he treated Adam's fall in historical 
context. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Anxiety, 41-46, 60-73. For Niebuhr, the Fall 
story itself is a myth. Any chronological succession of sin from Adam to succeeding 
generations is unnecessary because the Fall story is the existential analysis of the sin 
of man in general. 
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natural history." 
The Augustinian interpretation of original sin as an inherited taint is 
a literal interpretation of the Fall story. Niebuhr strongly criticized this 
literal interpretation which aggravates the absurdity of "inevitable but not 
necessary." 
It is obviously necessary to eliminate the literalistic 
illusions in the doctrine of original sin if the paradox of 
inevitability and responsibility is to be fully understood; for the 
theory of an inherited second nature is as clearly destructive of 
the idea of responsibility for sin as rationalistic and dualistic 
theories which attribute human evil to the inertia of nature. 
When this literalistic confusion is eliminated the truth of the 
doctrine of original sin is more clearly revealed; but it must be 
understood that even in this form the doctrine remains absurd 
from the standpoint of a pure rationalism, for it expresses a 
relation between fate and freedom which cannot be fully 
rationalized, unless the paradox be accepted as a rational 
understanding of the limits of rationality and as an expression 
of faith that a rationally irresolvable contradiction may point to 
a truth which logic cannot contain.' 
From his conviction of Kierkegaard's dialecticism, Niebuhr agrees 
with the necessity of the rationally absurd "inevitability and responsibility" 
set forth by classical theology in the doctrine of original sin. But Niebuhr 
points out that a literalistic interpretation of original sin as inherited sinful 
nature goes back to the Hellenistic mistake of seeing the origin of sin in 
historical events and in nature. The true paradox or dialectic has to escape 
from this error. According to Niebuhr, the final paradox of "inevitable but 
" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 260. 
" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 262. 
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responsible" should be as follows: 
The Christian doctrine of original sin with its seemingly 
contradictory assertions about the inevitability of sin and 
man's responsibility for sin is a dialectical truth which does 
justice to the fact that man's self-love and self-centredness is 
inevitable, but not in such a way as to fit into the [sic] the 
category of natural necessity. It is within and by his freedom 
that man sins. The final paradox is that the discovery of the 
inevitability of sin is man's highest assertion of freedom.' 
Man inevitably sins in his highest assertion of freedom. The explanation 
with psychological analysis is as far as possible to go. Niebuhr sees that 
only by faith the absurdity of the dialectic of "inevitable but responsible" 
can be accepted. 
Thus, Niebuhr keeps the truer dialecticism, rejecting the literalistic 
interpretation of the Fall story and identity of original sin with inherited 
inertia. Niebuhr believes a mythical interpretation of the story. 
The myth of the Fall of Adam universalizes, as well as 
individualizes, this theme of man's revolt against God. The 
influence of this myth upon the Christian imagination is not 
primarily due to any literalistic illusions of Christian orthodoxy. 
The myth accurately symbolizes the consistent Biblical 
diagnosis of moral and historical evil. Adam and, together with 
him, all men seek to overstep the bounds which are set by the 
Creator for man as creature.' 
Things that happened to Adam actually happen to all individuals in 
5° Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 263. See also Hofmann, The 
Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 195. 
51 Niebuhr, Faith and History, 120-21. 
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the world. Adam's fall is an existential analysis of man." This myth does 
not testify to the origin of sin in the first man of history. 
The metaphysical connotations of the myth of the Fall are, 
however, less important for our purposes than the 
psychological and moral ones. It is in its interpretations of the 
facts of human nature, rather than in its oblique insights into 
the relation of order and chaos as such, that the myth of the 
Fall makes its profoundest contribution to moral and religious 
theory. The most basic and fruitful conception flowing from 
this ancient myth is the idea that evil lies at the juncture of 
nature and spirit.' 
According to this statement, Niebuhr thinks that concern over 
whether Adam and his fall historically existed or not is not the right one 
expected from the myth.' 
Reconstruction of the doctrine of original righteousness 
Observing that the error of classical Christian theology on the 
doctrine of original sin is its literal-chronological identification of Adam's 
52 Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 172. 
53 Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (New York: Harper 85 
Brothers, 1935), 79. 
54 Niebuhr identifies the fall of Adam with man's sinning. By doing so he 
escapes the problem that orthodoxy has of defining original sin as the inherited sinful 
nature. It should also be mentioned that Niebuhr is heavily indebted to Kierkegaard 
for this way of escaping the problem. Kierkegaard's interpretation of Adam's fall is 
utilized by Niebuhr in basically the same form. Kierkegaad's concern is the difference 
of the quality of sin between Adam and later individuals within the orthodox 
understanding of original sin Similar to Niebuhr, Kierkegaard denies the idea of 
original sin as inherited sinful nature. Kierkegaard thinks that, as in Adam's fall, the 
qualitative leap from innocence to guilt has to happen in later individuals. This idea 
comes close to Pelagianism. Kierkegaard added the idea of quantitative accumulation 
of sinfulness in the world in history to the criticism of Pelagianism. Kierkegaard, 
Concept of Anxiety, 30-50. 
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fall with an historical event, Niebuhr interprets the Fall story as a universal 
symbol of the condition of sinful man in general. Related to this 
interpretation, he has to deal with the natural question accompanying it, 
How should we understand original righteousness which is supposed to be 
lost through the Fall? 
In Catholic theology, man lost only donum supernaturale or 
supernatural gifts from God, namely faith, hope, and love; he never lost 
justitia originalis, which belongs to human nature. In other words, by the 
fall man lost only something which is not essential to man and he still 
keeps original righteousness. By contrast, Protestantism understands that 
the image of God is destroyed, and while man's original righteousness is 
lost there is some possibility of its remnant in insignificant aspects of 
human behavior.' Niebuhr briefly summarizes the problem of such 
chronological interpretations in relation to original righteousness. 
The relation of man's essential nature to his sinful state 
cannot be solved within terms of the chronological version of 
the perfection before the Fall. It is, as it were, a vertical rather 
than horizontal relation. When the Fall is made an event in 
history rather than a symbol of an aspect of every historical 
moment in the life of man, the relation of evil to goodness in 
that moment is obscured.56 
In Niebuhr's reconstruction of original righteousness, the distinction 
between what is not and is lost is not in chronological or horizontal sense, 
' Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 269. 
56 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 269. 
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but in vertical or ethical sense of high and low at any moment. More 
precisely, it is the dialectical dynamic between original righteousness and 
sinfulness in man. 
To the essential nature of man belong, on the one hand, all his 
natural endowments, and determinations, his physical and 
social impulses, his sexual and racial differentiations, in short 
his character as a creature imbedded in the natural order. On 
the other hand, his essential nature also includes the freedom 
of his spirit, his transcendence over natural process and finally 
his self-transcendence. 
The virtue and perfection which corresponds to the first 
element of his nature is usually designated as the natural law. 
It is the law which defines the proper performance of his 
functions, the normal harmony of his impulses and the normal 
social relation between himself and his fellows within the 
limitations of the natural order. . . . 
The virtues which correspond to the second element in 
his nature, that is, to the freedom of his spirit, are analogous to 
the "theological virtues" of Catholic thought, namely faith, 
hope and love.' 
Niebuhr defines two kinds of virtue that accompany the anthropology 
studied in chapter 2. Natural law is a virtue necessary for man as creature. 
The virtues of faith, hope, and love are not donum supernaturale, special 
gifts from God, but requirements of man's natural freedom of spirit to relate 
with God and fellow individuals.' Man's freedom requires faith in God's 
providence, because without it man seeks an impossible self-sufficiency to 
control his fate in the temptation of anxiety. It also requires hope in future, 
which is a realm of terror if man does not have hope in the providence of 
57 Niebuhr, Me Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 270-71 (ellipses added). 
58 Wolf, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of Man," 240. 
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God. Finally, it requires love to relate his spirit to other spirits more than at 
the level of natural cohesion. Man's social nature makes him live in 
community. 
Since men are separated from one another by the uniqueness 
and individuality of each spirit, however closely they may be 
bound together by ties of nature, they cannot relate themselves 
to one another in terms which will do justice to both the bonds 
of nature and the freedom of their spirit if they are not related 
in terms of love.' 
In this context of love, the self can relate with the other as a subject 
not an object. The relation is that of I and Thou, not that of I and it.6°  
When Niebuhr says vertical contrasts, he does not mean the contrast 
between a higher virtue of spiritual freedom and a lower virtue of natural 
law. Rather, he means the ideal condition of both virtues and their 
empirical sinful condition. Niebuhr says, "Both are corrupted by sin: but 
both are still with man, not indeed as realizations but requirements.' 
Niebuhr's position, in terms of original justice, is not optimistic like 
Catholicism, but not pessimistic like Protestantism, either.' 
According to Niebuhr, the relation between original righteousness 
and sin is like health and illness. When man becomes sick, he loses his 
health, but it is still discerned as the law of his body. Similarly, by the fall 
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 271. 
6° Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 272. 
61 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 277. 
62  Durkin, Reinhold Niebuhr, 108. 
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original righteousness ceases to be man's possession but is still law. 
This analysis of the matter leads to the conclusion that 
sin neither destroys the structure by virtue of which man is 
man nor yet eliminates the sense of obligation toward the 
essential nature of man, which is the remnant of his perfection. 
This sense of obligation is, in fact, the claim which the essential 
nature of man makes upon him in his present sinful state. The 
virtue which corresponds to the true nature of man therefore 
appears to sinful man in the form of law.63  
In other words, when man sins, he always faces original righteousness in 
the form of law. Man does not possess it but is required to fulfill it. 
The self in the moment of transcending itself exercises the self's 
capacity for infinite regression and makes the previous 
concretion of will its object. It is in this moment of self-
transcendence that the consciousness and memory of original 
perfection arise. For in this moment the self knows itself as 
merely a finite creature among many others and realizes that 
the undue claims which the anxious self in action makes, 
result in injustices to its fellows." 
This psychological analysis of the transcendent man in the moment 
of infinite possibility shows his encounter with original righteousness as he 
knows the reality of sinful intention of the anxious self before its action. The 
transcendent-self can come to a recognition of sinfulness and realize "right 
general intention" in its contemplation, but the self is betrayed by anxieties 
and fears to carry it out in a specific action.65 "Perfection before the fall is 
63 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 272. See also Hofmann, The 
Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 159. 
64 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 277. 
65 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 293. 
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perfection before the act."66 Niebuhr thinks that the Fall story reflects this 
fact. "Adam was sinless before he acted and sinful in his first recorded 
act."67 This fall of Adam is the experience of every man each time he 
commits sin. In each committing of sin, man, in a moment of 
transcendence, realizes the contradiction between his sinful condition and 
the state of harmony of relationship between himself, God and his neighbor. 
Original righteousness is this human awareness of the tension between his 
sinful reality and what he has to be as required by law. Original 
righteousness is in the memory and knowledge of the required law.68 
Salvation from sin 
Grace 
To take up the challenge of understanding human history from a 
soteriological perspective, Niebuhr naturally utilized the idea of analogy 
with soteriology for individuals. Before coming to this perspective, he 
examined the doctrine of grace, which is closely related to soteriology for 
the individual. 
Niebuhr started with the meaning of grace in the New Testament: 
The two emphases are contained in the double connotation of 
66 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 294. 
67 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 294. 
68 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 294. 
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the word "grace" in the New Testament. Grace represents on 
the one hand the mercy and forgiveness of God by which He 
completes what man cannot complete and overcomes the sinful 
elements in all of man's achievements. Grace is the power of 
God over man. Grace is on the other hand the power of God in 
man; it represents an accession of resources, which man does 
not have of himself, enabling him to become what he truly 
ought to be.69 
Grace has two facets, as the power of God over man and as the power 
of God in man. The relation of these two meanings of grace in soteriology is 
very important. Niebuhr criticized the Catholic belief of the subordination 
of justification (the power of God over man) to sanctification (the power of 
God in man), or of justification as the prelude to sanctification. According to 
this theory, 
the divine mercy, mediated through Christ, destroys the sinful 
contradiction between man and God, and turns the soul from 
self-love to obedience; whereupon it may grow in grace and 
achieve constantly higher stages of sanctification. This 
subordination of justification to sanctification becomes 
definitive for the whole Catholic conception of life and history." 
Through producing good works in history, man can reach the goal of life; 
this would also be another new source for sinful pride. In the stage of 
sanctification, basically the problem of spiritual sin is resolved and only 
man's finiteness remains.' 
69 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, pp. 98-99. 
" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 135. 
"Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 144. Niebuhr thinks that 
good works are the fruit of grace in man, but that they do not contribute to man's 
salvation. Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 125. 
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In its polemic concerning spiritual sin against the Catholics, the 
Protestant Reformation asserted the impossibility of Catholic sanctification 
as merit for man's salvation by emphasizing justification by grace. 
The Reformation understands that therefore we are 
"justified by faith" and "saved in hope"; that we must look 
forward to a completion of life which is not in our power and 
even beyond our comprehension. It realizes that the unity of 
human existence, despite its involvement in, and freedom from, 
natural process, is such that it cannot be "saved" either by 
disavowing its freedom in order to return to nature, or by 
sloughing off its creaturely character so that it may rise to the 
"eternal." This is a final enigma of human existence for which 
there is no answer except by faith and hope." 
Although Niebuhr highly prizes the recognition of man's radical 
sinfulness and of the mistake of Catholicism's new sin of pride through 
sanctification, two aspects of grace become obscured. 
Niebuhr thinks that the relationship of the two aspects of grace is 
very delicate and paradoxical and suggests the correct understanding: 
The real situation is that both affirmations—that only God in 
Christ can break and reconstruct the sinful self, and that the 
self must "open the door" and is capable of doing so—are 
equally true; and they are both unqualifiedly true, each on its 
own level. Yet either affirmation becomes false if it is made 
without reference to the other." 
Thus Niebuhr believes that these two inseparably related meanings 
of grace are crucial to understand man's salvation. After the synthesis of 
two aspects of grace of Catholicism was denied, however, historically the 
72 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 149. 
73 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 118. 
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emphasis on justification (the power of grace over man) was made by the 
Reformation, and the emphasis on sanctification (the power of grace in 
man) was made by the Renaissance—but without the understanding of 
grace from God.74 
The Reformation on the other hand represents a more complete 
break with the medieval tradition; for it interprets "grace" 
primarily, not as the "power of God" in man; but as the power 
(forgiveness) of God towards man.75  
And 
The Renaissance is, when considered from the 
standpoint of Christian doctrine, "sanctificationist" in principle. 
In it all the reservations upon the hope of fulfilling life and 
realizing its highest possibilities, expressed in the prophetic-
Christian consciousness, are brushed aside.' 
Niebuhr claims that the Reformation invited cultural obscurantism 
by its indifference towards the relative distinctions of truth and falsehood." 
Observing church history, Niebuhr judges that neither the Catholic nor 
Reformation churches conceive and relate to worldly authority, society, 
truth, and the like outside of spiritual matters, according to a proper 
understanding of grace. The medieval Catholic church declared her 
possession of infallible authority and truth, which is the same sin of pride 
74 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 150-53, 226. 
75 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 150. 
76 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 153. 
77 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 191. See also Hofmann, The 
Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 167. 
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and pretension that the world makes. The Reformation churches are 
charged more with laziness in applying their understanding of the 
doctrines of sin and grace to cultural matters and truth in a context of 
brotherhood. 
After considering the insufficient and partial understanding of grace 
in the Reformation and Renaissance, Niebuhr presents a new synthesis of 
grace: 
A new synthesis is therefore called for. It must be a 
synthesis which incorporates the twofold aspects of grace of 
Biblical religion, and adds the light which modern history, and 
the Renaissance and Reformation interpretations of history, 
have thrown upon the paradox of grace. Briefly this means that 
on the one hand life in history must be recognized as filled with 
indeterminate possibilities. There is no individual or interior 
spiritual situation, no cultural or scientific task, and no social 
or political problem in which men do not face new possibilities 
of the good and the obligation to realize them. It means on the 
other hand that every effort and pretension to complete life, 
whether in collective or individual terms, that every desire to 
stand beyond the contradictions of history, or to eliminate the 
final corruptions of history must be disavowed.' 
According to Niebuhr, the reformers thought that salvation and 
justification are gifts of grace, but that salvation and justification do not 
change the reality of the sinfulness of sinners. Niebuhr thought that this 
understanding of the reformers would have been the right perspective for 
avoiding the church's involvement in the same sin of pride as the world 
commits, as well as for understanding cultural endeavors in a soteriological 
78 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 207. 
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context, if it had been applied. This humble self-understanding would have 
prevented the church from boasting of possessing absolute authority or 
truth on earth. 
The truth remains subject to the paradox of grace. We may 
have it; and yet we do not have it. And we will have it the more 
purely in fact if we know that we have it only in principle. Our 
toleration of truths opposed to those which we confess is an 
expression of the spirit of forgiveness in the realm of culture. 
Like all forgiveness, it is possible only if we are not too sure of 
our own virtue." 
In such an understanding of grace, the Reformation's humble 
recognition of salvation by grace and continuous sinfulness and 
nonpossession of absolute truth is indispensable, as is the recognition of 
the importance of cultural and historical endeavors carried out from the 
perspective of grace in man. This is only possible in Niebuhr's synthesis of 
grace for man (justification) and grace in man (sanctification). 
Salvation of the individuals 
As we have seen early in this chapter, Niebuhr defines sin from a 
dialectic anthropological perspective as man's pride. Man attempts to 
complete his life by himself, depending on his transcendent spirituality, 
ignoring his finiteness as a creature. Because of his pretension of perfect 
infiniteness or transcendence of his freedom, he takes the place of God 
Almighty. 
" Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 243. 
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Man is constantly tempted to the sin of idolatry and constantly 
succumbs to it because in contemplating the power and dignity 
of his freedom he forgets the degree of his limitations.' 
Niebuhr does not talk much about individual salvation. But we can 
summarize it as simply that at the moment of temptation through anxiety, 
there is a way for man to avoid sin by faith in God, instead of plunging into 
deeper sin with his pretension of self-sufficiency.' Niebuhr praises the 
doctrine of "salvation by grace through faith" of the Reformation. Even 
though he does not discuss the matter in classical theological language, he 
accepts the principle of salvation by grace through faith. In his own words, 
The Reformation understands that therefore we are 
"justified by faith" and "saved in hope"; that we must look 
forward to a completion of life which is not in our power and 
even beyond our comprehension. It realizes that the unity of 
human existence, despite its involvement in, and freedom from, 
natural process, is such that it cannot be "saved" either by 
disavowing its freedom in order to return to nature, or by 
sloughing off its creaturely character so that it may rise to the 
"eternal." This is a final enigma of human existence for which 
there is no answer except by faith and hope.' 
In the process of believing, man needs to come to the spiritual stage 
of contrition. At this stage, man realizes the guilt of his efforts to overcome 
the limitation of freedom and to fulfill the self-completion of his life.' With 
this preparation, the Gospel makes contact with the contrite to lead him to 
80 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 166. 
81 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 182. 
82 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 149. 
83 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 57. 
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the faith in which he recognizes God is the only possible person to fulfill his 
life. 
Basically, this is a form of salvation for the individual. Niebuhr 
seldom mentions judgment as punishment, because his understanding of 
the message of special revelation eases the fear of judgment. According to 
him, one of the messages is that, at the time of the last judgment, before 
God there is no one righteous.' Finally in the revelation of the Cross, the 
message is 
the assurance that judgment is not the final word of God to 
man; but it does not regard the mercy of God as a forgiveness 
which wipes out the distinctions of good and evil in history and 
makes judgment meaningless.' 
Salvation of the collectives 
The theme that Niebuhr continually pursued was history as man's 
drama (man as subject), so his concern was obviously more on the social, 
political, and cultural enterprises in the temporal world. In such contexts, 
he treats the problem of sin in society, politics, cultures, and so forth. He 
believes that the very origin of sin of the collective-self is in the sin of the 
individual-self, but the collective-self, like the state, has such enormous 
Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 149, 44. 
' Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1, 142. It is not clear whether or 
not Niebuhr believed in a universal salvation, a possible interpretation of this 
particular message of biblical revelation. If he did, that fact would help to make sense 
for his infrequent mention of judgement and punishment in his The Nature and 
Destiny of Man. 
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power and possibility of freedom that individuals learn to realize the end of 
their lives through the collective-self. Through these processes, the 
collective-self comes to have an organ of will. The guilt of the collective-self, 
which has a larger transcendental possibility, is more serious than the 
individuals'. 
One of Niebuhr's achievements is the accusation of social sins and 
evils based on his dialectic anthropology, in contrast to the sentimentalism 
of liberal Protestantism's belief in human possibility. While he analyzes 
social sins and evils in their various forms in history, he does not see 
salvation of the collective-self through a simple confession of faith. Niebuhr 
observes human history itself as the history of human endeavor for 
redemption. Because of the human structure of possessing spiritual 
transcendence and freedom, man tries to fulfill his life either in the eternal 
or in nature. Human history, in this sense, is a history of self-redemption. 
In a broader sense, human history as human endeavors will be judged in 
the end. Niebuhr's concern is this self-redeeming effort in human history 
and how we should understand it from the teaching of the Bible. Hence in 
his treatment not only social sin and evil but also various ideas of justice 
and truth as human good works are considered.' For the judgement of the 
task, the way Niebuhr takes is the application of his understanding of grace 
to culture and truth, the history of self-redemptive endeavor. Application of 
86 Especially chapter 9 of The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2. 
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the doctrine of grace to redemption in truth and culture is explained. 
For it is not possible to remain fully conscious of the egoistic 
corruption in the truth, while we seek to establish and advance 
it in our thought and action. But it is possible in moments of 
prayerful transcendence over the sphere of interested thought 
and action to be conscious of the corruption; and it is also 
possible to carry this insight into our interested thoughts and 
actions so that it creates some sense of pity and forgiveness for 
those who contend against our truth and oppose our action. 
But "grace" enters and purifies our thought and action fully 
only if the contradiction between it and "nature" (in this case 
corrupted truth) is understood. Here lies the secret of 
forgiveness. Mercy to the foe is possible only to those who know 
themselves to be sinners.' 
This is how Christians live in the cultural world in accordance with the 
application of the doctrine of grace. By doing so, the gospel will penetrate 
culture and truth, then self-redeeming history as a whole. Here merciful 
love, the law of love as the revelation of Christ commands, is exercised with 
humble recognition of no possession of absolute truth, through grace for 
man, and recognition of one's foe who has his own belief of truth as a fruit 
of grace in man. 
As examined earlier, according to Niebuhr without special revelation 
the sense of judgement by the Creator on history as the works of creature is 
the universal recognition of man gained through general revelation. In this 
context, Niebuhr thinks that the double aspect of grace is the way of 
salvation as the possibility of the fulfillment of human history. 
' Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 217. Hofmann, The Theology 
of Reinhold Niebuhr, 238, summarizes Niebuhr's understanding of the Christian 
attitude toward the secular world as embodying both relatedness and separatedness. 
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The double aspect of grace, the twofold emphasis upon 
the obligation to fulfill the possibilities of life and upon the 
limitations and corruptions in all historic realizations, implies 
that history is a meaningful process but is incapable of 
fulfilling itself and therefore points beyond itself to the 
judgment and mercy of God for its fulfillment.' 
Moreover, using Paul Tillich's similar understanding of the work of 
grace in truth, Niebuhr presents how grace works in man when the gospel 
encounters him: 
Professor Tillich's analysis of the thought which transcends all 
conditioned and finite thought, and proves its transcendence 
by its realization of the finiteness of thought, is a precise 
formulation of the ultimate self-transcendence of the human 
spirit, revealed in its capacity to understand its own finiteness. 
It is a philosophical formulation of this reality, and therefore 
deals with the problem of finiteness and not of sin. Sin is the 
refusal to admit finiteness. This refusal is sinful precisely 
because spirit has the capacity to recognize its finiteness. But 
when it refuses to do so its sinful self-glorification must be 
broken by the power of "grace." What Professor Tillich 
describes could therefore be equated with what I have defined 
at another point (Vol. I, Ch. X) as "perfection before the fall," 
the perfection which hovers as possibility but not as actuality 
over all action. If this possibility is realized at all, it belongs to 
the realm of "grace" and cannot be merely ascribed to the native 
endowment of spirit: that is its capacity for self-transcendence. 
Without such a capacity there would indeed be no "point of 
contact" for "grace," that is, without a shattering of the false 
sense of self-sufficiency and universality of spirit, the effort 
would be made (as it is made in idealistic philosophy) to extend 
the pinnacle of self-transcendence in the human spirit until it 
becomes universal spirit, that is God.89 
Recognition of the limitation of transcendence or freedom of man is 
88 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 211. 
89 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 218, footnote 4 (emphasis 
added). 
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understood to be the work of God through grace. With this prerequisite 
preparation of man's heart, that is contrition, the gospel has "a point of 
contact" with the heart; then the recognition is possible that only God can 
fulfill the absolute truth and meaning of history. Niebuhr expresses this 
grace in the collective context as well. 
If we examine any individual life, or any social 
achievement in history, it becomes apparent that there are 
infinite possibilities of organizing life from beyond the centre of 
the self; and equally infinite possibilities of drawing the self 
back into the centre of the organization. The former 
possibilities are always fruits of grace (though frequently it is 
the "hidden Christ" and a grace which is not fully known which 
initiates the miracle). They are always the fruits of grace 
because any life which cannot "forget" itself and which merely 
makes brotherhood the instrument of its "happiness" or its 
"perfection" cannot really escape the vicious circle of 
egocentricity.90 
Grace makes man—whether individually or as a society—recognize 
his limitation, finiteness, or sinfulness; grace then leads him to contrition. 
The human spirit does not have the capacity to admit limits or sinfulness of 
the self, or untruthfulness in the context of culture and truth. These are 
given by grace. Although Niebuhr does not distinguish which aspect of 
grace this grace is, because contrition is beyond the capability of the spirit 
of the self (grace in man), it must be grace for man, unless Niebuhr has 
another category.91  
99 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 123. 
91 If grace for man is strictly defined as God's grace for man's salvation, the 
grace that is given for the self to have contrition—a grace beyond that which is already 
present in man—is neither kind of grace. Because the contrite self is a preparatory 
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According to Niebuhr, the message of final judgement is that God will 
separate good and evil, but there is no one righteous before God and He will 
take all guilt and sin on Himself to be punished. Even though Niebuhr 
seemingly advocates a universal salvation, his emphasis on the importance 
of the separation of good and evil is strong. 
The Christian doctrine of the Atonement, with its paradoxical 
conception of the relation of the divine mercy to the divine 
wrath is therefore the final key to this historical interpretation. 
The wrath and the judgment of God are symbolic of the 
seriousness of history. The distinctions between good and evil 
are important and have ultimate significance. The realization of 
the good must be taken seriously; it is the wheat, separated 
from the tares, which is gathered "into my barn," which is to 
say that the good within the finite flux has significance beyond 
that flux." 
While Niebuhr insists on the importance of the separation of good 
and evil, at the same time and with the same strength he insists that God 
as merciful Messiah overcame His wrath as Judge. The works of history as 
man's self-redeeming effort would be recognized as the work of evil because 
of self-redeeming thought—even there is a good spirit in a worldly sense. 
The merciful God takes those incomplete and insufficient works to make 
them complete beyond history.' 
condition in Niebuhr's thought, it is not certain that the contrite self surely comes to 
faith of salvation. It seems, rather, to belong to the category of "common grace" in 
reformed theology. 
92 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 211-12. 
93 It seems that Niebuhr thinks of redemption of secular endeavors as 
universalistic salvation. Hans Hofmann, in his The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 
208-9, supports this idea by saying "God as Judge considered man's guilt heavy. He 
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Role of Jesus Christ in salvation 
In Niebuhr's soteriology, the fulfillment of salvation is beyond history, 
and only hope of salvation is given by faith. In such a soteriology, the role of 
Jesus is fairly ambiguous and in need of clarification. 
It is important to know that Niebuhr's soteriology is different from 
that of classical Christianity due to his unique understanding of sin from 
an anthropological and psychological perspective. It is logical to present 
salvation as the opposite of sin, and it is necessary to express salvation 
with words related to his understanding of sin. In this sense, his 
understanding of salvation is a psychological soteriology. 
The most important role of Jesus Christ in the theology of Niebuhr is 
that of vessel of God's special revelation. According to his anthropology, 
man cannot fulfill his life and history with spiritual transcendence, because 
his transcendental ability is limited, not absolute. Man, with his sin of pride 
which leads him to a pretence of his absolute power, takes the place of God 
to fulfill his life and destiny." Observing human history, Niebuhr shows 
that man struggles with his attempts to fulfill his life and history. With 
did not blur the difference between good and evil. He did not declare a general amnesty 
which would leave guilt unexpiated. Yet God loves man and 'wills not the death of the 
sinner,' but rather that he repent. He sees man's heart and knows that sin is not 
merely the regrettable slip of an essentially good man, but a perversion of the will 
which deforms the whole man and distorts all his thoughts and deeds. God then takes 
upon Himself the guilt of sin and all its fatal consequences, in the atoning death of His 
Son on Golgotha. By His personal giving of Himself in the Holy Spirit to each individual 
man, He gives to men this redemption, so that every man becomes a new creature in 
inner communion with God." See also Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 181. 
94 See both "Sin as Pride and Sensuality" and Sin in this chapter. 
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general revelation and historical revelation, and without the revelation of 
Christ, man could arrive at the idea of judgement by the Creator God, 
prophetic warning and messianic hope, recognizing the incapability of 
self-redemption in history.' Niebuhr believes that Hebrew religion and 
Roman law are respectively the highest of human religion and moral rule 
within the sphere of general revelation and historical revelation without the 
revelation of Christ, but even so there is no way for the redemption of man 
with these highest of human achievements.' 
Special revelation in Christ is needed for the redemption of man. 
According to Niebuhr that special revelation is as follows: 
The self-disclosure of God in Christ is significantly 
regarded by Christian faith as the final "word" which God has 
spoken to man. The revelation of the Atonement is precisely a 
"fmal" word because it discloses a transcendent divine mercy 
which represents the "freedom" of God in quintessential terms: 
namely God's freedom over His own law.97  
In the revelation in Christ, the character of God as a merciful God of love is 
revealed. This was the answer to the prophetic-messianic problem, namely 
how God's mercy related to his justice (or wrath). With the limitation of 
general revelation and historical (or special) revelation, man rose to the idea 
of God as 
Judge and Messiah, but without the special revelation of the Cross, he 
95 See Revelation in chapter 1, 14ff. 
96 Niebuhr, Beyond Tragedy, 20. 
97 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 67. 
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could not reach the resolution of the problem." 
Adding to the disclosure of God's merciful character regarding 
judgement, the revelation of Christ reveals the suffering love of Christ as 
the norm of love for man to fulfill the meaning of life. 
Christ as the norm of human nature defines the final 
perfection of man in history. This perfection is not so much a 
sum total of various virtues or an absence of transgression of 
various laws; it is the perfection of sacrificial love." 
Jesus Christ as the special revelation is both the "Son of God" to 
reveal God's character as the merciful judge and the "Second Adam" to 
show the norm of sacrificial love for man to fulfill his life. It is significant for 
Niebuhr to have these two facets of the revelation of Christ, because the 
revelation of God's love corresponds to his understanding of the grace for 
man that is God's work for man's salvation, and the revelation that is 
normative for man's life corresponds to the grace that works as a power in 
man.100 
According to Niebuhr's understanding, there is no fulfillment of the 
meaning of history (in other words, self-redemption) in history. Within 
general revelation and historical revelation, man cannot resolve the enigma 
98 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 30. 
99 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 68. 
1' Wolf, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of Man," 237, points out that, while 
Niebuhr denies the classical doctrine of Christ's two natures in one person, he sees 
the revelation of both the divine will of God and the human norm of suffering love in 
Christ. 
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of the relationship between justice and mercy of God. Man cannot reach 
salvation by himself because of his limited transcendental capability. This 
is a fact of created human nature. Out of the struggle and confusion, man 
was able to see the impossibility of self-redemption, but he never found the 
right way or information to escape from this problem within himself and 
history. The only resolution of this problem is to be given from above by God 
in Christ's Cross. In this special revelation, God's redemptive love for man 
is shown. Thus the fear of judgement with which man has been threatened 
is mingled with the hope of mercy.'°' 
The revelation of Christ as the Second Adam is normative for man to 
fulfill his life and collective history. Without revelation and grace, man can 
only achieve mutual love as his norm. Only by Christ's suffering and 
sacrificial love can the norm for man be shown. 
The most direct relationship of love to the problems of 
community would seem to be the purifying effect of sacrificial 
love upon mutual love. Mutual love and loyalty are, in a sense, 
the highest possibilities of social life, rising above the rational 
calculations and the power-balances of its rough justice. The 
grace of sacrificial love prevents mutual love from degenerating 
into a mere calculation of mutual advantages. If mutual love is 
not constantly replenished by impulses of grace in which there 
are no calculation of mutual advantages, mutual relations 
degenerate first to the cool calculation of such advantages and 
finally to resentment over the inevitable lack of complete 
reciprocity in all actual relations.'°2  
'Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 109. 
102 Niebuhr, Faith and History, 185. 
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Thus the importance of the special revelation of Christ is obvious. If 
there were not that special revelation, there would be no clue for man to be 
sure of the hope for merciful judgement and of the right way of fulfilling his 
life and history. Because special revelation is the indispensable key for 
human redemption, the life, and especially the cross, of Jesus Christ is 
important. 
In Niebuhr's thought, man's apprehension and acceptance of the 
special revelation of Christ is almost the same as his salvation. 
For God reveals both His mercy and His judgement in these 
disclosures. If the disclosure is therefore apprehended in 
repentance and faith it will also lead to a reformation of life. It 
can not be apprehended without repentance, because the God 
who stands against us, "whose thoughts are not our thoughts" 
(Isaiah 55:8) can not be known if we do not contritely abate the 
pretension of reaching God by our thought or of regarding His 
power as an extension of our power. Thus the faith which 
apprehends the disclosure of the divine mercy and will implies 
and requires a repentance which leads to a reformation and 
redemption of life. 
The apprehension of the revelation is only possible by faith, accompanied 
by repentance and contrition. Niebuhr, furthermore, develops the process 
that starts with acceptance by faith and leads to redemption of life. For 
Niebuhr redemption definitely means God's merciful redemption or 
completion of history with his absolute sovereignty at the end of history, 
not in history. 
The reason for the importance of apprehension of the revelation is 
1°3 Niebuhr, Faith and History, 106. 
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derived from Niebuhr's understanding of the revelation itself. For him the 
biblical revelation must be mythologically or symbolically interpreted. 
The Biblical symbols cannot be taken literally because it 
is not possible for finite minds to comprehend that which 
transcends and fulfills history. The finite mind can only use 
symbols and pointers of the character of the eternal. These 
pointers must be taken seriously nevertheless because they 
express the self-transcendent character of historical existence 
and point to its eternal ground. The symbols which point 
towards the consummation from within the temporal flux 
cannot be exact in the scientific sense of the word.' 
For Niebuhr, the fall of Adam, the virgin birth of Christ, Christ's 
resurrection, and the eschata (Christ's Second Coming, Last Judgement, 
general resurrection of body) are not understood literally.' The reason for 
his criticism of a literal interpretation of biblical revelation is that it breaks 
the dialectical relation of eternity and temporality. In this dialecticism, 
there cannot be continuity between eternity and time. 
For apprehension and acceptance of special revelation, man needs a 
contrite heart and faith to accept it subjectively (existentially), because he 
needs to understand the deeper meaning of the revelation with its 
symbolism that does not accord with a rational thinking process.1' 
Thus in Niebuhr's soteriology the role of Jesus Christ is very limited. 
For him the historical events themselves of Jesus' life are not important, 
loa Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 289. 
los Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), 197-98. 
106 Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism, 23. 
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but the symbolic meaning of the events, especially the cross of Christ, are. 
Faith is required to apprehend the revelation. Concerning this point, the 
role of faith is very different from a conservative Christian belief. In that 
soteriology, faith is a gift from God to accept Jesus Christ as Savior, who 
has done the soteriological work of a substitutionary death for sinners, 
followed by his victorious resurrection and ascension.' There may be a 
similarity of usage of "faith" for both to mean accepting the truth which is 
not comprehensible with rational intelligence. But there is crucial 
difference between conservative faith, which confesses a realized salvation 
based on the historical fact of Jesus' redemptive work, and Niebuhr's 
redemptive hope at the end of history, which is confessed by faith. In 
Niebuhr's soteriology, Jesus Christ was just a vessel of the final special 
revelation which gives hope of salvation (redemption of human history) for 
the repentant who has faith to accept the revelation and no more than that. 




The orthodox theologian John Edward Carnell appraises very highly 
Niebuhr's theological attempt as follows: 
There is probably no side to the theological system of 
Niebuhr which strikes a truer note than this high and 
wholesome emphasis upon agape love as exhausting both the 
height of man's freedom and the outside revelation of God's law 
in Jesus Christ. One can only draw back and admire the 
magnificent way that Niebuhr has succeeded in relating the 
Christian doctrine of love to some of the most complex facets of 
the human situation. It is a rare individual who manages to 
remain true to so exalted a moral imperative throughout an 
entire system of thought.' 
Although Carnell's book, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, takes a critical 
posture towards Niebuhr, he admits the significance of Niebuhr's theology. 
With the concern of Christian Realism, one of Niebuhr's main 
theological tasks was how he could elaborate on man as a sinner. Niebuhr's 
doctrine of sin succeeds in this purpose. In his theology, because of his 
understanding of the Fall story as a myth, Niebuhr makes the story a 
universal symbol of sinners in general. In other words, Niebuhr does not 
develop his study on an alleged first fall of man in history. Therefore, 
including the process of the occurrence of sin through anxiety in the 
dialectical condition of man, his doctrine of sin is precisely that of actual 
sin. In this sense, Niebuhr's anthropological and psychological doctrine of 
1  Carnell, The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr, 136-37. 
sin is not only unique but also has appeal to man's heart.2 Recognizing the 
limitation of ontological theology, Niebuhr pursued a psychological analysis 
of sin, which he thought was able to express sin closer to its reality. It is 
easier for man to agree with Niebuhr's analysis of sin as a description of a 
psychological expression of his sinfulness. His psychological approach to 
understand sin opened new directions for theology. 
The importance of Niebuhr's doctrine of sin is its adaptation of 
psychological analysis of individual sin to a social and cultural level. 
Niebuhr does not doctrinally discuss much the relation between them, but 
a considerable amount of historical analysis is offered in his works to 
persuade readers. From an apologetic perspective, Niebuhr analyzes 
various kinds of thought, religions and culture, and he evaluates their 
mistakes from his belief of dialecticism, pointing out their error of 
attempting to find the goal of life, history or truth either in the eternal or the 
temporal.' On that groundwork he explains a deeper understanding of his 
doctrine of sin and how man should live (history as man's achievement). 
Though, strictly speaking, the origin of his analysis of sin is from 
Kierkegaard, of the creativity of anxiety is from Heidegger, and of the 
dialectic of human structure is from Augustine and Scheler, to his credit 
2 Concerning the depth of development of psychological analysis, Kierkegaard's 
study which Niebuhr utilizes in his works is deeper. Cf. Kierkegaard, The Concept of 
Anxiety. 
The first four chapters in The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 1 develop this 
analysis. 
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Niebuhr's achievement is a total synthesis of them all in a way that 
evaluates the sinfulness of society and gives hope by faith in the future 
beyond history. 
In a sense, this synthesis is his endeavor to establish the foundation 
of the balance between continuity and discontinuity. The discontinuity for 
which Niebuhr stands firm is apparent in his understanding of history. 
Following Kierkegaard, he does not allow any possibility of fulfillment of life 
either in the eternal or the temporal, so it was necessary for him to seek the 
realization of the goal of life and history "beyond history." 
On the other hand, continuity is sought in revelation, especially in 
private (general) revelation. In actuality, this revelation in the human 
conscience and history depends on its recognition by the spirit of man. 
Concerning this point Hamilton notes: 
In place of the old division of revelation into 'general' and 
`special', he proposes a division into `personal-individual' or 
`private' revelation and 'revelation in the context of social-
historical experience'. The result of this change in terminology 
is to make all revelation the product of experience, i.e. that 
which issues from, and is guaranteed by, spirit in man.4 
This idea of human experience as revelation of God is rooted in the 
emphasis on religious experience of liberal theology, which is based on a 
more immanent theology. Hamilton further declares: 
Revelation, therefore, is spiritual recognition. God is accessible 
to man because man has the requisite endowment of spirit. 
Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit," 30. 
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And this applies equally to both divisions of revelation, because 
revelation in history and society is founded upon universal 
private revelation. Without the private revelation of God,' 
writes Niebuhr, 'the public and historical revelation would not 
gain credence.' The importance of this admission should not be 
overlooked, since it declares quite unambiguously that the 
human spirit has been elevated to the position of an infallible 
authority. Only that can be believed which has first passed the 
scrutiny of the human spirit and there has found recognition.' 
Hamilton clarifies a relic of liberalism, namely man's capability 
through his own actions to know God, in Niebuhr's understanding of the 
role of spirit as the subject of the recognition.' It seems that Niebuhr seeks 
a "point of contact" between God's will (the gospel of the eternal God) and 
man, the creature, within the framework of a posited discontinuing 
dialectic of the eternal and the temporal, even though he is not sure 
whether or not he has succeeded. The only possible locus of point of contact 
is in man, because man is the only existence who has the synthesis of spirit 
and body in him anyhow. According to the unreserved possibility of the 
human spirit advocated by liberalism, man can be divine in the sense that 
he is only quantitatively different from God. Niebuhr eludes this mistake by 
realizing the limitation of man's spirit as creature. Even though Niebuhr 
acknowledges such a dialectical condition of man, he still needs to seek the 
possibility of the encounter of the eternal and the temporal only in man. 
5 Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit," 30. 
6 This is a very different understanding of revelation from Barth, who 
maintained the discontinuity by emphasizing the perpendicular revelation from God 
with his absolute freedom. 
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Niebuhr avoids liberalism's mistake of seeking Kingdom of God on earth not 
only by his recognition of human limitation and sin, but also by the basic 
framework of a dialectical discontinuity of the eternal and the temporal. 
Thus Niebuhr found continuity in the fact of the existence of 
revelation, the will of the eternal God in man and historical events, and the 
capability of the spirit of man to recognize revelation. In a sense, as 
Hamilton thinks, because recognition of the revelation depends on the 
spirit of man, it can be said that "spiritual discernment brings salvation."' 
In Niebuhr's thought, salvation is not reality but hope of the realization of 
life. But still it is difficult to see how Niebuhr's capability of man's spirit as 
the key for the hope of salvation is different from liberalism's seeing it as the 
key for the realization of Kingdom of God on earth. Although it could be 
considered that the difference is just a matter of degree of the capability of 
man' spirit, the doctrine of sin is the anchor that keeps Niebuhr from the 
mistake of liberalism. Hans Hofmann explains: 
But Niebuhr certainly does not accept the conclusion 
which might be drawn from Bultmann's writings that man 
when he is confronted by the divine revelation finds his true 
self. For Niebuhr, it is God Himself in the divine revelation who 
brings man into close communion with Himself so that man 
does not, like Adam, hide himself behind the trees of his 
finitude and creatureliness, but understands the nature of the 
evil in himself. Confronted by the revelation of God, what man 
finds is not himself but his sin.8 
Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit," 15. 
8 Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 149. 
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Thus, the doctrine of sin in Niebuhr's thought is the key part of the 
balance between continuity and discontinuity between the eternal and the 
temporal. If what man finds in revelation were his true self, the liberal 
attitude to the realization of the self in belief of an immanent theology 
would result. 
For orthodoxy to learn from Niebuhr's anthropology and his doctrine 
of sin, there are a few points to discuss. First, there is his dialectical 
understanding of the nature of man. In Niebuhr's case, anxiety as 
concomitant with the dialectical structure of man is contended to lie in the 
context of actual sin. For orthodox Christianity, there is a major problem 
here. Since the dialectic of the transcendence of spirit and the finiteness of 
creatureliness in man is a universal condition of creation, Adam before his 
fall had to have anxiety. However, in the perfection of God's creation, 
anxiety coming together with the dialectic of man's nature is impossible.' In 
9 Niebuhr himself could not explain Adam's anxiety because of his mythic 
interpretation of the Fall, but Kierkegaard did discuss it. Because of the closeness of 
their thought on anxiety, we may use Kierkegaard's understanding of anxiety of Adam 
for our purposes here. According to Kierkegaard, during his time of innocence before 
his fall, Adam had an anxiety of "nothing," of "ignorance." But the spirit, which 
sustains the soul and body of man, is in the condition of dreaming. In this situation, 
anxiety exists but peace and repose are still in man. Kierkegaard, The Concept of 
Anxiety, 38-46. Carnell explains Kierkegaard's understanding of the relation of spirit 
and anxiety: "The synthesis of the eternal and the temporal is not a second synthesis 
but is the expression for the first synthesis in consequence of which man is a 
synthesis of soul and body sustained by spirit." Spirit finds its freedom in the moment 
of decision, the moment being "an atom of eternity." It is the "moment" which is the 
locus of anxiety (dread) for Kierkegaard, since the moment opens up to the individual 
the simultaneous attraction of seizing eternal potentialities and the fear of the 
dizziness which would attend their actual possession. Whenever freedom comes to 
itself, therefore, anxiety results. Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 70. When 
man actualizes the possible self, of which the spirit dreamed in its decision in freedom, 
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the sense of prology, it is proper to expect Adam's development, for example 
spiritual and intellectual growth and fellowship with God. But any 
defectiveness of creation, like anxiety, dread, or worry, could not have been 
originally present in creation. It is important to recognize the biblical view 
of the unity of man, as Hamilton says: 
This may seem to be a relatively unimportant matter of 
theological method, but its implications run deep and wide; for 
it has the effect of abolishing the biblical view of man as a 
unity—which Niebuhr ostensibly wishes to preserve—in favour 
of body-spirit dualism. Man, standing at the juncture of nature 
and spirit, is a being divided. Since his spirit is not included in 
his creatureliness he discovers himself to be an uneasy 
combination of disparate elements, a higher and a lower. The 
higher alone represents man as he is essentially, while the 
lower constitutes a continual threat to his integrity because it 
is basically antagonistic to spirit.' 
At creation, perfect harmony and unity of spirit and body was given 
to man, not an anxiety that comes with an unstable condition in the 
structure of man. It is more biblical to consider that, because of the curse 
after the fall of Adam, the harmony and unity of man's spirit and body was 
destroyed and anxiety occurred as the result of that destruction. 
Niebuhr's reconstruction of the doctrines of original sin and of 
original righteousness is a rejection of orthodox understanding. The 
presuppositional key that makes his reconstructions possible is his 
anxiety disappears, either in a sinful way or not. But in the next moment another 
anxiety appears. Thus, in Kierkegaard's thought, anxiety existed from the beginning of 
man, though in the dreaming condition of spirit, peace and repose are preserved. 
1° Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit," 29. 
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mythological understanding of the Fall story. Accordingly, the 
chronological relation between Adam and succeeding generations—which 
Niebuhr thought to be the reason for the confusion and mistake of orthodox 
theology—is denied, and the Fall story is interpreted as a myth that 
symbolizes the process of sin in man in general. Niebuhr's reconstruction 
depended on this universal rather than chronological interpretation of the 
Fall story. However, even if the Fall story were a myth that is not historical 
fact and symbolized or expressed the common understanding or truth of 
society, that would not mean that the author of the Fall story did not have 
any intention of writing history. In fact, the entire Genesis account is a 
description of the history of man, which is then succeeded in Exodus. The 
writer of Genesis started with the origin of the world and man, the fall of 
man, then man's history as a sinner. The immediate context of the 
genealogy after Adam right after the Fall story as a chronological 
description of human history is too obvious to be denied. Thus from the 
context around the Fall story, it is more plausible to understand that the 
supposed ahistorical myth by Niebuhr is still used to explain history. The 
presupposition of Niebuhr's reconstruction is impossible to be posited. 
In chapter 3, it is pointed out that Niebuhr's salvation is the hope of 
salvation, not the reality of salvation. Jesus was just a symbol of Christ, as 
well as a vessel of the revelation of Christ. Hammar considers the relation 
between Jesus and Christ as follows: 
Niebuhr succeeds brilliantly in restoring the 'myths' of the 
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Creation and the Fall into sin, but these 'myths' have not only a 
trans-historical content, they are in essence non-historical. A 
slight suspicion therefore easily arises that Niebuhr's concept 
of 'myth' refers not only to something trans-historical but also 
to something non-historical. Is then the 'myth' of Christ also 
non-historical as the Creation and the Fall into sin? That is the 
decisive critical question of Niebuhr's theology. . . . 
Nevertheless Niebuhr's 'mythical' interpretation of the 
Christian dogmatic tradition forces him to do away with the 
Incarnation. If his 'mythical' thinking really has reference to 
something non-historical, then Niebuhr must be forced to 
reckon, on the one hand, with a relative historic Jesus and, on 
the other, with an absolute transcendent Christ. ... Niebuhr 
clearly states that the relation between Jesus and Christ does 
not differ from the relation between 'all life and history and the 
transcendent,' i.e., Jesus is a general revelation of the 
transcendent Christ! While the non-historical Christ is 
absolute as God, Jesus is relative as man is! 11 
Thus Jesus is not reckoned as God incarnate, but as a man who was 
the revelation of the transcendent Christ and a vessel of the revelation. 
Such a Jesus as a mere man could not be worthy of carrying out the 
redemptive work of dying a substitutional death as the realization of 
salvation for sinners. There is no reality and certainty of salvation in the 
redemptive work of Jesus in Niebuhr's soteriology. His salvation is, as 
Hamilton thinks, "spiritual discernment": 
Note that the condition of Christ becoming a 'symbol' 
(and therefore meaningful) is the prior recognition on the part 
of men of the limitations of embodied spirit. Truth enters 
human lives by no other way than through man's proper 
spiritual awareness. Spiritual discernment brings salvation.' 
11 George Hammar, Christian Realism in Contemporary American Theology 
(Uppsala: Appelbergs Boktryckeriaktiebolag, 1940), 241-42 (ellipses added). 
12 Hamilton, "Created Soul Eternal Spirit," 32. 
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This recognition of the meaning of revelation is the action of the spirit 
or the self. Salvation depends on the work of man. This understanding of 
salvation strongly implies the character of Pelagianism.' Because of the 
Pelagianistic emphasis on man's work for salvation in Niebuhr's thought, 
as well as a strong possibility of universal salvation, his soteriology should 
be denied by orthodox theology. Even so, his intention and endeavor to 
interpret the historical and culture achievements of man in the context of a 
biblical soteriology should be recognized as a wonderful stimulation and 
challenge. 
When Niebuhr criticizes man's mistaken endeavor to fulfill his life, he 
focuses first on how man is an unstable synthesis of the dialectic of 
infiniteness and finiteness. Man then reacts to the presented reality of the 
dialectic between the eternal and temporal, wherein he chooses one or the 
other for the locus of fulfillment for his life. If man chooses the eternal for 
the locus of fulfillment, it is wrong because he forgets the fact of his 
finiteness that bonds him to the flux of nature. On the other hand, if man 
chooses the temporal for the locus he is wrong because he forgets the fact of 
his spiritual transcendence. Anxiety, which results from man's 
unstableness or uneasy conscience, can be resolved only by hope in the 
future beyond history through faith in God. At a glance this all seems 
biblical, but in fact biblical concepts are utilized to serve a strong conviction 
13 Carnell, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, 159. 
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of dialecticism. Niebuhr strictly affirms the discontinuity of the eternal and 
the temporal, which is the main emphasis of Kierkegaard's dialecticism 
against Hegel's. Niebuhr follows this dialecticism to avoid the realization of 
life and history in any achievement of man in history. Rather, he brings 
such a realization outside of history. Concerning this point, Niebuhr 
started with the criticism of liberal optimism belief in the human capacity 
to realize the Kingdom of God on earth. Denouncing the reality of man as 
sinner, he sees the impossibility of realizing the fulfillment of the final goal 
on earth.' One liberal theologian, Daniel Williams, questions the 
philosophical orientation in Niebuhr's thought that overshadows his 
biblical emphasis: 
My question to Dr. Niebuhr, then, is, How does he 
conceive the relation between what he refers to as "beyond 
history" and God's suffering and redemptive working in 
history? If he asserts God's actual transforming power in 
history, then it seems to me that his view comes close to what a 
realistic liberal theology of history would be. But if Niebuhr 
holds that we must think of a "three-storied" system of 
meaning, in which the realms of nature, history, and beyond 
history are somehow ultimately separate, then I have to say I 
do not believe that this is the way the Bible regards God's 
relationship to time and His creation, or that an adequate 
Christian interpretation of God's saving work in Christ can be 
put in this way. It seems to me to be an imposition of a Kantian 
epistemology and a Greek metaphysics on the Bible's dynamic 
conception of time as the form of the concrete encounter 
between God and man.'5  
14 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 245. 
15 Daniel D. Williams, "Niebuhr and Liberalism," Reinhold Niebuhr:• His 
Religious, Social, and Political Thought, ed. Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall (New 
York: Macmillan, 1956), 209. 
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Williams points out that the biblical view has God's interaction with 
history progressing with creation to salvation, but Niebuhr's thought is 
based on the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and the 
noumenal, or more correctly Kierkegaard's dialectic. Orthodox Christianity 
follows the biblical view of God's fulfillment of salvation on earth, yet from a 
different point of view than does liberalism. On this point, Williams shares 
with orthodoxy the idea that the basis of theology is the Bible. 
Niebuhr thinks that Jesus made mistakes because of his finite 
perspective. 
He [Jesus] expected the historic interim between the first and 
second establishment of the Kingdom to be short. In this error 
he was followed both by St. Paul and the early church, with the 
consequent false and disappointed hope of the parousia in the 
lifetime of the early disciples. This error was due to an almost 
inevitable illusion of thought which deals with the problem of 
the relation of time and eternity.16 
Here, Niebuhr presupposes in Jesus the discontinuity of the eternal 
and the temporal, and hence Niebuhr concludes that Jesus' expectation of 
the realization of the parousia, the coming of the eternal glorious Christ, 
was a temporal and thus mistaken judgment. Obviously Niebuhr's theology 
is based more on dialecticism than on biblical teaching. 
Feenstra says with Gustafson that Niebuhr believes that theological 
concepts and claims are justified by human experience, and that it is 
16 Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. 2, 49-50. Cf. Durkin, Reinhold 
Niebuhr, 99. 
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human experience that establishes the truth of theological claims.' For 
Niebuhr, dialecticism is more plausible to explain human reality and 
experience than is biblical teaching. He utilizes parts of biblical teaching 
but denies others that are not congruent with the reality of human 
experience, even after he tried a new interpretation of biblical teaching. 
To sum up this chapter, Niebuhr's doctrine of sin based on 
anthropology is very useful to understand how actual sin occurs in man, as 
well as collective sin in society. On the other hand, his soteriology that 
lacks the fulfillment of salvation through the redemptive work of Jesus as 
God and man, as well as his absorption of the distinction of good and evil in 
universal salvation, was too far from the orthodox position. Orthodoxy can 
thus only learn from Niebuhr's dynamic endeavor to interpret from a 
biblical perspective the achievements of history and culture as man's self-
redemption. Finally, Niebuhr's theology of man and sin is not fully biblical, 
because dialecticism is the more primary basis of his interpretation than is 
the Bible. 
17 Ronald J. Feenstra, "Reassessing the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr," Calvin 
Theological Journal 23 (1988): 155. 
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CONCLUSION 
Niebuhr has two theological frameworks within which he develops 
his theology: Christian Realism and dialecticism. First, Christian Realism 
proclaims the importance of the balance between the optimism of 
liberalism and the pessimism of neo-orthodoxy regarding the 
understanding of man. Put more philosophically, it maintains the balance 
between continuity and discontinuity between eternity and time. Christian 
Realism also stresses experience as the judge of dogma. Second, the 
dialecticism that Niebuhr follows is Kierkegaard's dialecticism. This 
dialecticism insists on the discontinuity between eternity and time. The 
discontinuity is clearly seen in Niebuhr's understanding of history. At the 
same time, as a Christian Realist he seeks continuity in revelation in man 
and history through man's spirit, which has the capacity to recognize that 
revelation. 
Without a comprehension of Niebuhr's anthropology, one cannot 
understand his doctrine of sin. Both are closely related. According to 
Niebuhr, man has a transcendent spirit as the image of God as well as a 
limited body in his creatureliness. In addition, there is anxiety as 
concomitant to the dialectic condition of man. When sin is presupposed, 
anxiety becomes temptation for man. Thus anxiety and presupposed sin 
are indispensable elements of man's sin, but anxiety itself is not sin. 
Niebuhr thinks that to escape from anxiety man commits sin in two ways: 
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pride and sensuality. When man pretends to have an unlimitedness of his 
spirit he commits the sin of pride. On the other hand, when he surrenders 
his transcendence of spirit and plunges into the vitality of nature, he 
commits the sin of sensuality. Niebuhr's uniqueness is his application of 
the consideration of individual sin to the collective-self, state, culture, etc. 
His highest concern is thus the historical achievements of man as self-
redemptive endeavor. 
Niebuhr's doctrine of salvation is different from that of orthodoxy. In 
the revelation of the Christ on the Cross, the mercy of God over judgement 
and the norm of sacrificial love for man is revealed. Man as individual and 
collective can realize that he is not able to fulfill his life and history on earth. 
With this contrite heart and faith man can hope for the fulfillment by God 
beyond history. In this soteriology, the historical Jesus is separated from 
the transcendent Christ. There is no place for Jesus as God's redeemer 
through his substitutionary death for sinners. Furthermore, Niebuhr 
believes in a universal salvation. He thinks that the distinction of good and 
evil in history is important, but at the time of last judgment before God 
there will be no righteous people. The merciful God takes up all sin upon 
Himself and fulfills the end of history beyond history. 
Niebuhr's doctrine of man and sin considers the sinner and actual 
sin. By a reinterpretation of the doctrines of original sin and of original 
righteousness, he rejects a chronological relation between Adam and later 
men. The conservative Christian can learn much from and be greatly 
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stimulated by Niebuhr's unique analysis of actual sin of the individual and 
of man as collective. This is especially true of his psychological analysis 
based upon an outlook of the dialectical structure of man, which provides a 
new direction of approaching the understanding of man and sin. Also, his 
challenge to resolve the perennial question of "inevitable but responsible" 
sin by a reinterpretation of original sin and righteousness should be 
praised from the perspectives of the coherency of his understanding of sin 
as actual sin and of his apologetic mind. Unfortunately, his rejection of the 
chronological relation between Adam and later men caused too wide of a 
gap to prevent an inevitable theological contention. 
There was some danger for Niebuhr to lose his position of 
discontinuity when he found continuity in the ability of man to recognize 
the revelation of God. As in liberalism, if Niebuhr recognized only the 
positive image of man, man's immanent possibility would be emphasized. 
But actually Niebuhr spoke of man's possibility in relation to his limitation, 
and the content of the revelation recognized by man is his sinfulness and 
limitation instead of his unlimited possibility. Thus, the doctrine of sin is 
the key factor to keep a balance between continuity and discontinuity in 
Niebuhr's theology. 
The last thing to say concerns his final foundation of theology. 
Niebuhr is more dependent on and faithful to dialecticism than to Biblical 
teaching. For his Christian Realist mind, dialecticism explains the human 
experience more properly than does the Bible. Because of this experiential 
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criterion, some of the Biblical teachings of Jesus and Paul are discerned as 
errors. Such a radical difference of fundamental presupposition forewarned 
orthodoxy to be careful to learn from his theology. 
In conclusion, Niebuhr's doctrines of man and of sin are great 
accomplishments that contain various theological insight and stimulation 
for the orthodox Christian to utilize and consider in his own theological 
framework. On the other hand, serious differences on the important issues 
of original sin and righteousness and of soteriology, as well as the difference 
of theological foundation, mean that very careful observation is required to 
study Niebuhr's doctrines of man and sin. 
109 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bennett, John C. Christian Realism. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 
1941. 
Berke, Matthew. "A Century in Books: An Anniversary Symposium." First 
Things 101 (March 2000): 33-36. 
Brown, Charles C. Niebuhr and His Age: Reinhold Niebuhr's Prophetic Role 
in the Twentieth Century. Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 
1992. 
Brown, Robert McAfee, ed. The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr: Selected Essays 
and Addresses. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. 
Brunner, Emil Man in Revolt: A Christian Anthropology. Translated by 
Wyon Olive. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1947. 
Burtt, E. A. "Some Questions About Niebuhr's Theology," In Reinhold 
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, Edited by 
Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
Carnell, Edward John. "Niebuhr's Criteria of Verification." In Reinhold 
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, Edited by 
Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
. The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1951. 
Durkin, Kenneth. Reinhold Niebuhr. Harrisburg: Morehouse Publishing, 
1989. 
Feenstra, Ronald J. "Reassessing the Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr." Calvin 
Theological Journal 23 (1988): 142-60. 
Fitch, Robert E. "Reinhold Niebuhr's Philosophy of History." In Reinhold 
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, Edited by 
Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
Flynn, John Leo. Justification: A Comparison of the Doctrine of Reinhold 
Niebuhr with the Doctrine of the Council of Trent. Rome: Gregorian 
University Press, 1970. 
Fox, Richard Wightman. Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biology. New York: Patheon 
Books, 1985. 
110 
Gilkey Langdon. "Reinhod Niebuhr's Theology of History." In The Legacy of 
Reinhold Niebuhr. Edited by Nathan A. Scott, Jr. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1975. 
Hamilton, Kenneth. "Created Soul Eternal Spirit: A Continuing Theology 
Thorn." Scottish Journal of Theology 19 (1966): 23-34. 
Hammar, George. Christian Realism in Contemporary American Theology. 
Uppsala: Appelebergs Boktryckeriaktiebolag, 1940. 
Hampson, Daphne. "Reinhold Niebuhr on Sin: A Critique." In Reinhold 
Niebuhr and the Issues of Our Time. Edited by Richard Harries. 
London: Mowbray, 1986. 
Harland Gordon. The Thought of Reinhold Niebuhr. New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1960. 
Hofmann, Hans. The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr. Translated by Louis 
Pettibone Smith. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956. 
Kierkegaard, Soren. The Concept of Anxiety. Translated by Reidar Thomte. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980. 
. Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Translated by David F. 
Swenson and Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1941. 
Kroner, Richard. "The Historical Roots of Niebuhr's Thought." In Reinhold 
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought. Edited by 
Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
Lehmann, Paul. "The Christology of Reinhold Niebuhr." In Reinhold 
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought. Edited by 
Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
Lovin, Robin W. Reinhold Niebuhr and Christian Realism. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
McCann, Dennis. Christian Realism and Liberation Theology. Maryknoll: 
Orbis Books, 1981. 
. "Reinhold Niebuhr." In A New Handbook of Christian Theologians. 
Edited by Donald W. Musser and Joseh L. Price. Nashvill: Abingdon 
Press, 1996. 
Milbank, John. The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, Culture. 
111 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. 
Neuhaus, Richard John, ed. Reinhold Niebuhr Today. Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1989. 
Niebuhr, Reinhold. An Interpretation of Christian Ethics. New York: Harper 
& Brothers, 1935. 
. Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian Interpretation of History. 
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937. 
. Christian Realism and Political Problems. New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1953. 
. Faith and History. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949. 
. "Intellectual Autobiography of Reinhold Niebuhr." In Reinhold 
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought. Edited by 
Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
. "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism." In Reinhold Niebuhr: His 
Religious, Social, and Political Thought. Edited by Charles W. Kegley 
85 Robert W. Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
. The Nature and Destiny of Man. Vol. 1. New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1941. 
. The Nature and Destiny of Man. Vol. 2. New York: Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1943. 
Oates, Whitney Jennings. Basic Writings of Saint Augustine. Vol. 1. New 
York: Random House, 1948. 
Plaskow, Judith. Sex, Sin and Grace: Women's Experience and the 
Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. Washington, D.C.: 
University Press of America, 1980. 
Przywara, Erich. An Augustine Synthesis. New York: Happer 85 Brothers 
Publishiers, 1958. 
Raines, John C. "Sin as Pride and Sin as Sloth." Christianity and Crisis 29 
(1969): 4-8. 
Rasmussen, Larry, ed. Theologian of Public life. London: Collins, 1989. 
Richardson, Alan. "Reinhold Niebuhr's as Apologist." In Reinhold Niebuhr: 
112 
His Religious, Social, and Political Thought. Edited by Charles W. 
Kegley & Robert W. Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
Sanderson, John W., Jr. "Historical Fact or Symbol?" Westminster 
Theological Journal 21 (1958) 58-74. 
Scott, Nathan A., Jr., ed. The Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1975. 
Shinn Roger L. "Realism, Radicalism, and Eschatology in Reinhold 
Niebuhr: A Reassessment." In The Legacy of Reinhold Niebuhr. 
Edited by Nathen A. Scott, Jr. Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1975 
Smith, Ruth L. "Reinhold Niebuhr and History: the elusive liberal critique." 
Horizon 15 (1988), 283-98. 
Stone, Ronald H. Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians. Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1972. 
. Professor Reinhold Niebuhr. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox 
Press, 1992. 
Thelen, Mary Frances. Man as Sinner, in Contemporary American Realistic 
Theology. New York: King's Crown Press, 1946. 
Tillich, Paul. "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of Knowledge." In Reinhold 
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought. Edited by 
Charles W. Kegley & Robert W. Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
van Til, Cornelius. The New Modernism, An Appraisal of the Theology of 
Barth and Brunner. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed 
Publishing Company, 1946. 
Williams, Daniel D. "Niebuhr and Liberalism." In Reinhold Niebuhr: His 
Religious, Social, and Political Thought. Edited by Charles W. Kegley 
& Robert W. Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
Wolf, William J "Reinhold Niebuhr's Doctrine of Man." In Reinhold Niebuhr: 
His Religious, Social, and Political Thought. Edited by Charles W. 
Kegley & Robert W. Bretall. New York: Macmillan, 1956. 
113 
